

AMERICAN CROSSROADS

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Empire's Tracks

INDIGENOUS NATIONS, CHINESE WORKERS,
AND THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD

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Lakota

LONG BEFORE THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD, Lakotas sustained their collective lives through expansive relationships that they forged with each other, and with their homelands. Luther Standing Bear once wrote of this expansive relationship to place:

No people ever loved their country or enjoyed it more than the Sioux. They loved the beautiful streams by which they camped, and the trees that shaded them and their tipis. They loved the green stretches of plains with its gardens here and there of sunflowers over which hovered and played myriads of yellow-winged birds. Moving day was just like traveling from one nice home to another.¹

Standing Bear described a love based on a deep knowledge and appreciation of the complexity and variations of life in Lakota homelands, knowledge and appreciation that is the context of Lakota collective life, a form of possession *by* their homelands as much as a possession *of* those lands, a kind of reciprocal relationality. Lakota modes of relationship provided the strongest obstacle to the expansion of capitalism and U.S. sovereignty on the Plains in the second half of the nineteenth century, where machines of colonial expansion fueled by relationships of control met Indigenous modes of relationship between people, animals, plants, and places, shaped by an expansiveness that reflected the expansiveness of the place itself.² Focusing on Lakota historical geographies, and away from train tracks, highlights Indigenous relationships to place that are oriented to a different set of tracks: the tracks of massive, migratory buffalo herds.

Standing Bear described Lakotas' expansive relationship with place: "It was not like moving from one strange town to another, but wherever they

settled it was home."³ Where mobility has long been part of a sense of home among Lakotas, home, from a colonial perspective, can be, at best, a flickering mirage of security grounded in expropriation. For colonizers, who have taken what is not theirs, being expropriated, in turn, remains an ever-lurking possibility. Colonial sovereignty is counterinsurgency, what I call counter-sovereignty. This chapter analyzes the confrontation between expansive Lakota modes of relationship and the war-finance nexus.

BUFFALO NATION

The social foundations of expansive relationality reverberate in stories of Lakota origins. According to one Lakota creation story, Pe' Oyate' were humans who lived underground, and a few of them were enticed to the earth's surface by the aroma of freshly roasted buffalo meat. Anukite', who had been banished to the earth's surface, hunted a buffalo, roasting its meat, tanning and decorating its hide with porcupine quills, and then the trickster Iktomi left the robe and meat in a cave. Seven men and seven women followed the scent to the surface, where their descendants founded the seven councils that structure the Ocei Sakowin, which European invaders would come to call the "Great Sioux Nation." As the seasons turned, tormented by the cutting north wind, these fourteen people desperately and unsuccessfully searched for the cave that could return them to the underworld. Wazi and Wakanka, who were Anukite's parents, and who had also been banished, taught these fourteen how to live on the earth's surface. Movement, adaptation, and collective risk-taking have long shaped Lakota collective life, continuing to inform dynamic Lakota modes of relationship.⁴

The movement of buffalo herds defined the contours of Lakota society on the Plains. According to Delphine Red Shirt, "Always, they tried to stay near the buffalo—like the oyate, the 'thaháka' were constantly on the move. They too migrated to better sources of food." Lakotas calibrated their calendar in proximity to the herds, from spring calving season through the major hunts in late autumn, when calves had matured. Lakota observations of buffalo also influenced the ways they organized community life. "They had common sense and we followed what they did. We learned to be like them because we depended upon them for everything." This was learning by observation, experiments leading to the development of new skills and new kinds of relationship, the way Wazi and Wakanka taught the fourteen people who first

came to the earth's surface, skills that sustained reciprocity rather than domination. Following buffalo herds, which adjusted their collective movements to find food, water, and shelter, Lakotas traced out a pattern of movements in relation to cycles of drought and rainfall, predatory pressure, and seasonal migrations. Theirs was an expansive relationship to place, emerging in dynamic relationship with the capacities for life on the lands where they lived.⁵

Delphine Red Shirt writes that Lakota winter counts record the first encounter with horses in the eighteenth century, and they soon "became as dependent on it as we were the buffalo." Lakota relationships with buffalo set the terms for incorporating horses into Lakota life, since horses enhanced Lakota abilities to follow the buffalo. Standing Bear described a time before horses, when buffalo sometimes wandered into villages to eat grass, and if there was a need for meat, the buffalo could be shared as a meal. A horse once followed a group of buffalo into a village, and as people gathered, watching it graze, a hunter was able to throw a rope on the animal's neck, and then a warrior was able to jump on its back. Lakota women's use of horses enhanced the mobility of their communities, broadening their communities' expansive relationships to their lands. While Standing Bear's story centers men in relation to horses, another story describes people's fear and bewilderment on seeing a strange, large animal, until an old woman manages to mount and subdue it. The age and gender of the rider are significant. Horses were useful not only as accoutrements of hunting, but also for community mobility.⁶

Over time, Indigenous peoples adapted horses, so that their horses might loosely be understood as an Indigenous technology particularly suited to collective life in the region. A soldier in U.S. campaigns against Lakotas during the late 1870s noted, "The Indian ponies are accustomed to thrive upon grass or cottonwood bark and can travel untriflingly upon such cheap fodder, while our cavalry horses break down unless they are provided with grain."⁷ The ecological and social relationships emanating from horses and bison for Lakota society bear a relation to Marx's model of the two departments of capital. The first department, geared toward the means of production, mirrors the role of horses in the buffalo economy. The second department, revolving around production for consumption, mirrors the place of bison in the buffalo economy. The different temporalities of capital in the two departments necessitate reproduction on an expansive scale, in order for the total capital to reproduce itself over succeeding cycles.⁸

The growing fur trade on the central and northern Plains eclipsed a trading economy centered in Mandan and Hidatsa villages, and isolated fur trade

posts became important trading sites. Initially established in 1832 or 1834, Fort Laramie, at the confluence of the Laramie and North Platte Rivers, at a place where the Plains begins to give way to the Rocky Mountains, was a significant site of this mercantile reorganization of space. Fur company employees and subcontractors trespassed on Indigenous hunting and trapping grounds, leading to an overproduction of furs and a corresponding drop in the value of beaver pelts in European markets. This augured a fuller development of a buffalo robe trade, further concentrating trading activity along the Missouri River, suffused with intense sexual and gendered violence.⁹

Toward the east, by the late 1840s, Dakota women had begun to participate directly in trade. The fur trade was structured around trading for goods on credit. Dakota women supplied furs for the trade, and they were primary consumers of trade goods. Credit, which underpinned the fur trade and its related economies, was a set of temporal relationships that enforced dependence. Credit was constitutive of the war-finance nexus, invoking personal relationships under the guise of "trust." But credit actually disrupted relationships, and accompanied sexual and gendered violence.¹⁰

The Lakota buffalo economy was not a capitalist one. A personal claim on bison was possible only after horses enabled individual Lakotas to ride into buffalo herds and make individual kills. According to Delphine Red Shirt, Lakota women "knew from the way the shaft was decorated whose arrow it was. Once they identified it, the carcass belonged to them. They could do with it as they wished."¹¹ Any claim on a buffalo, or on something harvested from a buffalo, only made sense through relationships with women, situated within larger communities.

Celane Not Help Him described how she works a deer hide "in old ways":

Deer hide, you soak it and then pull out the hair as much as you could and then scrape the rest. Then stake it a little bit and when it dries up, you put oil on it, or grease. We always use bacon grease or that kidney fat, and you tend it. I got those side blades that you work it with, back and forth. Then you turn it over, all directions, and it spread out but you have to work it before it gets too dry. When you put it away you wet double layer of towel and wrap it around so it won't get dry, and then you work it again. So you learn things like that and always remember how to do it. What you learn, nobody can take away from you.¹²

Lakota women's skilled and creative work was a primary point of contestation between Indigenous expansiveness and the expansionist pressures of the global fur trade. In North America, capitalist relations of production do not

supersede or eradicate Indigenous modes of relationship, but instead emerge in reaction to Indigenous modes of relationship. The persistence of Indigenous modes of relationship points to the imperative of decolonization, the possibility of unraveling colonial state formation as well as capital accumulation, as an imperative that is inherent within continental imperialism. On the Plains, the expanding reproduction of capital occurs, and can also be undone, in relation to expansive Indigenous relations rooted in place.¹³

Capitalism assimilated to Indigenous modes of relationship as it developed in the region. Leonard Crow Dog testified at the 1974 Sioux Treaty Hearing, "We are the nation. We are nation before even the government. Before we signed any treaties. We are nation."¹⁴ In Lakota memory, the fact of Lakota existence continues to render Lakota nationhood inviolate on Lakota lands. "The government," like capitalism, imposes expansion over expansiveness, control over reciprocity, and imagines humans as separate and over the world. The war-finance nexus reacts to the expansiveness embedded in Lakota relationships.

TREATY AT HORSE CREEK

In 1851, nearly ten thousand Lakota, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Shoshone, Assiniboine, Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara people gathered for eighteen days at Horse Creek, a few miles away from Fort Laramie, visiting, exchanging gifts, feasting, and adopting children and siblings. These are Indigenous diplomatic protocols, and the United States was peripheral to them. The talks took place in a circular arbor that Lakota and Cheyenne women built out of lodge poles and tipi covers. Imperialist diplomatic protocols were more closely reflected in the written text of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, which had been prepared beforehand, and which marked U.S. recognition of Lakota supremacy on the central and northern Plains, inaugurating a new round of confrontation. In the written treaty, representatives of the U.S. federal government imposed their own definitions of "nation" while imposing Cheyenne diplomatic practices on Lakota communities. The text declared an expanding United States as the sole power to negotiate on a basis of equality with Lakotas. The written treaty instituted a zone of intertribal peace on the Plains in a circumscribed area south of the Missouri River, east of the Rockies, and north of New Mexico and Texas, articulating a U.S. right to construct railroads, military forts, and other infrastructure in this area.

Territorialization proceeds through infrastructure planning and development. Imperialist peace proceeds through colonialist wars. What followed in ensuing years was a conflict between two armed camps, pitting Lakota expansiveness against U.S. expansionism. Counter-sovereignty, the U.S. pretension to legal authority over territory and bodies, revolves around an attempt to replace expansive Indigenous modes of relationship with expansionist modes of relationship, imagined through mystical conceptions of the unceasing expansion of capital, un tethered from physical constraints. Expropriating Indigenous modes of relationship is a constituent element of financial imaginaries that project growth, profits, and progress in a way that disavows any material constraints, a core and ongoing element of the political economy of counter-sovereignty. As financial capital is fictitious capital, counter-sovereignty is fictitious sovereignty, sovereignty that follows the organization and functions of credit: a future claim that is backed by the full force of the state.¹⁵

Following Lakota understandings, however, Lakotas who "signed" the treaty agreed not to the written text, but to everything that had been spoken during the proceedings. Increasing settlement and the establishment of heavily traveled overland roads reshaped the patterns of buffalo migrations, and Lakotas understood that they won compensation for this damage in the treaty negotiations. Several of the Lakota negotiators at Horse Creek were incensed upon learning that the written treaty set the boundaries of their territory at the Platte River, pointing out that they hunted as far south of the river as the Republican Fork of the Kansas River, and the Arkansas River. Black Hawk, an Oglala leader, told David Mitchell, the superintendent of Indian affairs and lead U.S. negotiator, "You have split the country, and I don't like it." The 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty heralded a shift in the regional presence of the United States, with the U.S. federal government now claiming military authority over the region.¹⁶

After 1851, the United States began constructing new permanent trading posts and military forts across the region, diffusing imperialist authority over Indigenous space. Some of this new infrastructure, like Fort Kearny, had been established to protect, and to profit from, westward-bound traffic on overland trails. New trading posts and military forts quickly became points of distribution, where settlers and colonial officials attempted to dictate the terms of trade and enforce a colonialist peace. Bulls could not be grown or harvested. Guns did not reproduce. Intertribal relationships, however, were alive and organic. Communities most resistant to the United States moved

northward, where, U.S. officials feared, they resupplied their arms through trade with Red River Métis. Scarcity continued to fail as a method for sustaining imperial control, unable to contain expansive Lakota modes of relationship.¹⁷

The 1851 treaty had carved the central and northern Plains into two opposing blocs. This stalemate exploded in August 1854 when a member of a group of Danish Mormons heading west filed a complaint at Fort Laramie that an Indian had stolen his property, killing and butchering a lame ox. Conquering Bear, a Brulé whom U.S. negotiators had named as head chief for all Lakotas during the treaty council at Horse Creek, reported the incident the same day, offering to help resolve the matter by paying the value of the ox. Absurdly, the commanding officer at Fort Laramie insisted that the person who killed the ox be turned over, and the next day, sent a force of twenty-nine infantry with a couple of howitzers to a large village eight miles away. On arriving, the soldiers quickly escalated their assault—soon after they started firing their guns, they fired off both cannons. The retribution against the outnumbered U.S. soldiers was swift and total. Among the casualties of the fighting was Conquering Bear himself. As soon as the violence subsided, the women of the village rapidly moved their homes and their children several miles away, seeking to defuse the violence, and seeking safety.¹⁸

A little over a year later, at daybreak on September 3, 1855, a retaliatory force of six hundred U.S. soldiers, led by Gen. William Harney, marched on a Brulé village camped about six miles off of a gorge in the North Platte River. Upon sighting the marching soldiers, the women villagers swiftly packed their belongings and began moving away. When Little Thunder, a village leader, attempted to speak with Harney, he was dumbstruck to learn that Harney assigned collective guilt to the entire village for the deaths of the U.S. soldiers from the previous year. At Blue Water Creek, the soldiers fired indiscriminately. One of the officers later rewrote history: "In the pursuit, women, if recognized, were generally passed by my men." We can see, here, colonial gallantry retroactively invoked to cover the reality of mass murder. After this day, Nick Estes writes, Lakotas call Harney "Woman Killer."¹⁹

The soldiers held all of the survivors as prisoners. A year after Blue Water Creek, at Fort Pierre, Woman Killer met with Lakota leaders to discuss the release of the prisoners and the restoration of annuities, insisting that Lakotas surrender individuals accused of crimes by the United States, and stay away from the overland trails, effectively ceding large swaths of territory through the heart of Lakota homelands. During these talks, he also demanded the

selection of liaisons, "chiefs," who could then be deposed only by U.S. presidential fiat, attempting to replace expansive relations of leadership with expansionist practices of administration, for efficient domination. Severt Young Bear remembered this a century later:

The government signed the treaty with some chiefs. They had a meeting there and they didn't have enough representatives of the Sioux bands. They made some agreements on this and they went back to Washington, revised it, the treaty, and they came back again to the same point, and they sent out to bring in the chiefs here.

When they came back, the chiefs they expected were not there at that meeting, so the government got sore and appointed some chiefs, "Hey Chief, come here, you look like you make a good chief," so they signed some documents and according to my oral history they were politically appointed chiefs.

In Young Bear's telling, these men were selected to fulfill an imperial role through a racist gaze, in which any Indian could be interchangeable with another, so long as it suited U.S. negotiators. In a meeting with Lakota leaders on the southwest side of the Black Hills, these politically appointed chiefs were later exposed as lacking authority within Lakota frameworks.²⁰

Indigenous land rights, enshrined through treaties, fundamentally contradicted land grants to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, as provided by the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act.²¹ To honor the property claim is to abrogate treaty obligations: to honor the treaties would be to dissolve capital claims on territory and resources. U.S. counter-sovereignty suspends its unraveling through yet another round of expropriative violence. The Pacific Railroad Act named a set of property claims that failed to reflect reality. It was U.S. sovereignty as a provisional declaration, sovereignty on credit, a colonialist bond to be honored on future maturation. This is the war-finance nexus. The United States, as it appears in the Pacific Railway Act, was not a place, or a set of relationships in a place. It was, more precisely, a set of threats about what would be done in and to the places it described.

President Lincoln signed the act into law on July 1, 1862, incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to be financed by 100,000 shares, initially valued at \$1,000. The future-orientation of the shares reflected the future orientation of Congress's sovereign claims over these lands. The law renamed Indigenous lands as "public lands," authorizing the Union Pacific to use dirt, stone, and timber for construction, granting 200 feet on each side of the line for stations, buildings, and other physical plant. The law was itself a

speculative enterprise to remake Indigenous lands, and Indigenous modes of relationship in and with those lands. The capital relationship is inextricable from processes of invasion and occupation, but the capital claim actually preceded any functional colonial occupation of the region. This relationship between the state and the corporation provides a window into the dual faces of colonization and accumulation, the war-finance nexus. In the law, the imperial state chartered the corporation, while on the ground, the corporation would manifest the terms of imperial sovereignty. Capital accumulation and countersovereignty each constituted the other, seeking to appropriate Lakotas of their expansive relations.

The U.S. Congress bestowed land outside of its control upon the Union Pacific Railroad, granting alternating sections of land on either side of the track, explicitly for the purpose of securing "the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores thereon." Security, here, can be understood in a dual sense: military control on the one hand, and on the other, managing the risks of financial capital, which, given the speculative nature of the law itself, were the risks of U.S. sovereignty claims. U.S. sovereignty over the Platte River country would be established through the war-finance nexus, blending military security with financial securities. The law defined terms for the maturation and repayment of railroad bonds in thirty years, legislatively annihilating Indigenous space through colonial time. Against the period of bond maturation, a period for the development of functional colonial sovereignty over the Platte River country, the law stipulated that failure to construct one hundred miles of track within two years of the law's passage, and one hundred miles each additional year, would result in the forfeiture of all Union Pacific assets. Indigenous nations' ongoing abilities to assert their distinct modes of relationship threatened the solvency of the Union Pacific Railroad and, in turn, threatened to unravel U.S. Congressional sovereignty by fiat.²² The mythology of free market competition is unmasked here, as an alibi for underlying relations of invasion and occupation that are a point of origin for corporate profits.

A month after the Pacific Railway Act planted a legislative flag on Lakota lands, on August 17, 1862, Lakotas' eastern relatives rose up against famine and assault in Minnesota. After their surrender on September 26, the United States treated Dakotas as war criminals. Women, children, and elders were held in a concentration camp at Fort Snelling. At least three hundred people died in this camp. Most remaining Dakotas were imprisoned at Davenport,

Iowa. More than a third of these Dakota prisoners died in custody. Four months later, President Lincoln signed orders for the execution of thirty-eight Dakota men in Mankato, Minnesota, the largest public execution in U.S. history. In reaction to the uprising, the United States nullified Dakota treaty rights and removed Dakota people westward to Nebraska and South Dakota.²³

Six days after the martyrdom of Dakota patriots, Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This timing reflects more than a mere coincidence. A formal end to slavery occurred in a context of financialized territorial expansion. The dissolution of the slave property claim (with credit to former slaveholders, and a newly imposed moral economy of indebtedness for freedpeople), would pair with the expansion of real estate claims that originate in theft, occupation, and genocide. Relations of credit and real estate animated the expansion of continental imperialism, as the Union Pacific Railroad carried the violence and terror committed against their eastern relatives directly into Lakota homelands.

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Two years after the Dakota Uprising, the military utility of the Union Pacific may already have been apparent to Maj. Gen. Grenville Dodge in the winter of 1864-65, when he led hostile campaigns against Lakotas. As Lakotas followed buffalo herds, the U.S. Army, according to Dodge's strategy, would follow Lakotas, but there was a difference. Where Lakotas followed the herds as a form of relationship, the U.S. Army would follow Lakotas to "pound" and "attack." Here we can see the difference between an expansive and an expansionist relationship to a place. Dodge had urged the army to prepare "to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded or forced to surrender."²⁴ Nakedly indiscriminate, constant violence would be the means for establishing U.S. sovereignty and stabilizing U.S. property claims. In Dodge's memory, the justification for the Union Pacific, and techniques for expropriating Indigenous nations, merged onto the same tracks: counterinsurgency, a reaction to the renewal of Lakota modes of relationship. Counterinsurgency remains at the heart of U.S. pretensions to sovereign authority over Lakota homelands.

William T. Sherman, Dodge's commanding officer, would prove a staunch ally of Union Pacific construction. Sherman was primarily interested in the

railroad as a means of military occupation. Settlement and troop movements, in his understanding, were constituent elements of a larger military strategy to enact some kind of functional control over Lakota homelands. Railroad surveying reflected an underlying imperative to transform specific places into extractive claims on credit. This is the orientation of U.S. countersovereignty over its supposedly "domestic" territory. James Evans, surveying the Black Hills in summer 1865 for the Union Pacific, reported that timber resources there could supply the railroad west of the North Platte River. Moreover, Evans reported, coal deposits at Bitter Creek and Black Buttes (where, decades later, a pogrom would drive Chinese miners from Rock Springs) made a case for routing the railroad in close proximity. The conditions of Evans's surveying work, however, were constrained by "Indian difficulties," which, over the course of the summer, had "rendered insecure" the entire Platte valley. In addition to timber and coal, Evans reported on U.S. military outposts, "but feebly garrisoned, and incapable of offering anything like a protracted defence." Fueled by a "feeling of insecurity," Evans assembled his report in much greater haste than he had initially planned. Indigenous presence constrained the production of empirical forms of colonial knowledge.²⁵ What could empirically be known or reported about the place was limited by the insecurity of invasion and occupation. Imperialism is a shaky ground for empiricism. Extraction and financialization are core elements of U.S. countersovereignty: the transformation of Indigenous places into capital claims that could be actualized at some future time, processes that were arrested (and which continue to be arrested) by the presence of Indigenous people, in an Indigenous present.

The perspective of a U.S. cavalryman is illuminating. Charles Springer kept a journal while serving on a campaign "in the country of the dreaded Sioux nation" over the summer of 1865. The place, itself, which the U.S. Congress had granted to the Union Pacific by legislative fiat, haunted Springer and his comrades. One of them cried out one July night, "The devil is shifting his headquarters. I can smell brimstone." In August, Springer and several of his comrades desecrated Lakota graves and then, as the weather turned sharply cold in early September, the company withstood three attacks, the harrowed soldiers speaking bitterly of surviving a brutal civil war only to be sent to suffer in Lakota country. "We swore mutually that this trip should be the last of our soldier life." As the north wind chilled their bones, the company's uniforms ran threadbare, and on the morning of September 9, "a horrid sight presented

itself to our eyes." Two hundred and fifty horses and mules had either died, or had become so weak they had to be shot. "The rain and cold still continued, we took our breakfast in silence. Everybody thought, what will become of us, if this weather continues so?" Over the course of their ordeal, the company mapped sites of Lakota winter camps, which the U.S. Army would soon put to tactical and genocidal use. On October 18, Springer encountered two former comrades who had married Lakota women, earning money as interpreters. Rejecting their suggestions that he do the same, Springer yearned instead to return to the United States.²⁶ He recorded two options for white men in this country: assimilate to Indigenous modes of relationship, or leave.

That September, reports of "Indians" near the Julesburg area had made it difficult for Union Pacific management to station workers close to the end of the track, slowing down construction. The previous April, Dodge had received an intelligence report from Col. W. O. Collins detailing Lakota communities north of the Platte River, between Red Butte and the Powder River. Noting conflicts and alliances, Collins provided population estimates for Oglalas and Brulés, as well as information about community leaders. Surveying the land and the people, the Union Pacific and the army created an archive, assembled under conditions of invasion, mobilized toward industrialization as counterinsurgency. This archive would enable the deployment of credit within the secure precincts of colonial monopoly. In November 1865, officers at Fort Kearney transferred carbines, muskets, and rifles to a division engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad, on the understanding that the arms would be returned within fifteen days. Three months afterwards, the weapons had yet to be returned. In June 1866, an interpreter described a visit to Fort Laramie by Spotted Tail, Standing Elk, Red Cloud, and Man Afraid of His Horses, Brulé and Oglala leaders, who "spoke much about not having any roads made through their country," asserting the ongoing and functioning primacy of Lakota modes of relationship in their homelands.²⁷

Expansive Lakota relationships, and Lakotas' actions to enforce these relationships, were central concerns for Union Pacific Railroad management. Dodge's 1867 *Report of the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific* begins with accounts of multiple attacks on Union Pacific surveying teams, translating the death of surveyors into a profit loss for the Union Pacific, balancing the books of industrial occupation. Thomas O'Donnell, who worked on Union Pacific construction, wrote of struggles against the weather, and the North Platte River, in the effort to build a secure bridge, going on to write:

There was then a squad of soldiers guarding the bridge, keeping the Indians from burning it. South of the Platte were three hundred hostile Indians. Jack Morrow, an Indian trader, told us they were getting ugly, not to trust them. We prepared to fight them.

The railroad workers, O'Donnell reminisced, were initially equipped with muzzle-loading Springfield rifles, placing pickets in half circles at night, laying track at a rate of one to five miles a day. After reports that thousands of fighters led by Red Cloud had been running away with graders' stock along the South Platte, O'Donnell's group received a shipment of new breech-loading rifles, which they then had to learn to use.²⁸ Breech-loaders, telegraphs, and other ancillary technologies arriving alongside trains aided industrial warfare in the region.

In Dodge's recollection, Union Pacific construction was an extension of the army, organized "purely upon a military basis." The ranks of the construction force were filled with Civil War veterans. The heads of most engineering parties and all of the construction groups had been officers. John Casement, who oversaw track-laying, had been a division commander. Military experience played an active role in railroad construction. "At any moment I could call into the field a thousand men well officered." The true significance of this military organization was not for the management of labor, or corporate competition with the Central Pacific Railroad, but instead the colonization of the lands through which the Union Pacific was being constructed. The central fact, for the emergence of industrial capitalism in this place, was expropriation. "There was no law in the country, and no court. We laid out the towns, officered them, kept peace and everything went on smoothly and in harmony." In Dodge's telling, the imperial state emerged in this place through the functions of the railroad corporation. Where the U.S. Congress had chartered the railroad corporation in the Pacific Railway Law, on the ground, the corporation preceded the state, attempting to remake Lakota lands as a space of capital accumulation. Labor on the Union Pacific Railroad entailed soldiering, as much as construction work. Confederate veterans who worked on Union Pacific construction, so-called "galvanized Yanks," played a part in reconstructing the United States following the Civil War. The conditions of Southern white reentry into the United States were not reconstruction, carrying the promise of multiracial democracy; they were, rather, conditions of continental imperialism. According to Grenville Dodge, captured Confederate soldiers preferred to fight Indians, rather than be returned to their former commanders, and the army organized them into the Second and

Third Regiments of U.S. volunteers, known as "Reconstructed Rebs," which defended Union Pacific construction.²⁹ The abridgement of emancipation did not occur in isolation from the development of industrial capitalism on the Plains, and the extension of U.S. territorial claims on a continental scale.

In May 1867, Samuel Reed, chief engineer for the Union Pacific Railroad, complained repeatedly of Indian raids taking horses and mules along the line of construction, imploring Sherman to move additional forces to fight on behalf of the railroad. The army's direct involvement in Union Pacific construction flowed partly from justifications for the railroad as a tool to stabilize its occupation of the region. In 1867, Ulysses S. Grant, then acting secretary of war, reported to Congress that completion of the transcontinental railroad would significantly reduce the cost of maintaining troops between the Missouri River and the Pacific Coast. Moreover, railroad construction would "also go far toward a permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties," enabling the United States to negotiate treaties from a position of strength. Dodge and Sherman coordinated railroad construction with invasion and occupation. In early January 1867, Sherman informed Dodge, "The point where you cross the North Platte and Fort Laramie will become great military points, and you should make arrangements with cars to land there our troops and stores." The railroad would enable the military occupation of Lakota homelands. Eleven days later, Sherman pledged to "give you all the aid I possibly can, but the demand for soldiers everywhere and the slowness of enlistment, especially among the Blacks; limit our ability to respond." Military occupation would feed the chain of credit and debt that had financed the Civil War. Sherman expected Freedmen to consecrate their lives to imperial expansion, rather than forging multiracial democracy, let alone achieving some form of compensation or self-determination.³⁰

Between these letters, Dodge had written directly to General Augur, requesting military escorts for work parties between Alkali Flats to Fort Sanders, from a perspective of labor management. "Any scare or attack ... would be fatal to us, and almost impossible to obtain the necessary laborers." Dodge explained that he planned to post grading parties every fifteen to twenty miles, with parties of scouts moving north and south of the line, looking for signs of Indigenous people moving through their lands between Lodge Pole Creek, the South Platte, and Laramie Fork, "a country very little known until the last year, when we developed it by our different engineering parties." Dodge envisioned grading the Union Pacific as the wedge of invasion, with Union Pacific engineers as explorers of the unknown, mapping the

land in order to reshape it, transforming the modes of relationship, the terms of life, on the land. This was encroachment, and it was the basis of capital accumulation, transpiring in a relationship of reaction to the ongoing relationships that Lakotas shared with their relatives, including their lands. A group of eleven engineers, with teamsters, cooks, a mail carrier, and a hunter, west of Laramie in February 1867, had a military escort of two companies, one infantry, one cavalry, because "the Indians were very bad . . . out there." The group did not encounter any Indigenous people, but the snow drove several of them blind, the others blackening their faces with charcoal "in order to soften the glare of light."³¹

While these intrepid explorers stumbled through the snow, Sherman implored Dodge, "I hope you will keep your men at work, spite of rumors, and even apparent dangers, for both General Augur and I will do all to cover the working parties that is possible." For 1867, Sherman explained, the army would concentrate its forces several hundred miles to the north, but he envisioned that by the following year, "by these railroads and the extension of your Great Road to the Black Hills (Sanders, if possible) and the Smoky Hill to the neighborhood of Cheyenne hills, we can act so energetically that both Sioux and Cheyennes must die, or submit to our dication." Sherman imagined the Union Pacific as a weapon to finally enact a credible threat of genocide. He imagined countersovereignty (and counterovereignty, in the final instance, only exists in the imagination), mapping out a specific threat space, which we might think of as the "interior" of the United States.³²

The Union Pacific Railroad, in Sherman's mind, was not an infrastructure for connection. The railroad was infrastructure to enforce a credible threat of total and catastrophic violence against Lakota communities. Three months later, Sherman reiterated that the army would soon be able to move more troops, especially cavalry, to the Plains, reposting them from "the reconstructed United States." That month, however, railroad work parties at Lodge Pole Creek, Rock Creek, Cooper Creek, and the Laramie plains faced attacks and had mules, horses, and cattle stock taken and tools destroyed. On May 27, Dodge escorted three U.S. peace commissioners to the end of track in Lodge Pole Creek valley, where they arrived just after noon, to witness "a large body of Indians" sweep down on grading parties, riding away with several horses and mules, before the graders could grab their guns. As attacks continued in Lodge Pole Creek valley in June, doubts began to creep in about the army's abilities to protect railroad construction. One person complained

to Dodge, "I fear Sherman can fight Georgia crackers better than he can Indians." In early July, workers at the base of the Black Hills were attacked by a group of Lakotas, who killed several of them and rode off their stock animals before the cavalry escort could even begin pursuit. This particular attack was noteworthy only because it was witnessed by army officers. Despite Sherman's musings on the genocidal potential latent in the Union Pacific, in the summer of 1867, U.S. military protection remained insufficient to protect railroad work parties.³³

On September 20, Sherman spoke at a treaty council with Brulé, Oglalas, and Cheyennes on the North Platte. Sherman described railroad construction as an elemental law of a new ecology that Lakotas could not overturn, speaking of white people in eastern North America, "They hardly think of what you call war out here, and if they make up their minds they will come to the plains as thick as the largest herd of buffalo and they will kill you all." The Americans, Sherman threatened, would replace the buffalo, and doing so, they would destroy the foundations of collective Lakota life. This desolation was the promise and fulfillment of countersovereignty. Sherman concluded, "This commission is not a peace commission only; it is also a war commission." As with the written text of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, imperialist peace proceeds through conditions of colonialist war.³⁴

While Union Pacific officials had been seeking protection from the U.S. Army for several years, the railroad itself now enabled the further penetration of military occupation over Indigenous lands and lives. Building the railroad occurred in tandem with building new military posts and supply lines. Fort Steele, for example, was erected in the summer of 1868 to protect the Union Pacific Railroad, at a summer and winter campsite, a central point for Indigenous movements. Restricting Indigenous mobility by enabling colonial mobility, the railroad provided a core infrastructure for continental imperialism.³⁵ The army's winter campaigns, a new and brutal tactic in which army units hunted and assaulted villages in the deep winter, were enabled by the ability to move troops and provisions over trails in subzero conditions. Winter campaigns struck communities in the precise time of year when food and heat were most scarce, conditions of scarcity that had been greatly exacerbated following several decades of colonial construction. Winter campaigns occurred during the months that, for Lakotas, were times of storytelling, renewing relationships across generations. The U.S. Army's winter campaigns assaulted the renewal of Lakota relationships.

Vine Deloria, Jr. explained how unilateral amendments that the United States made to the 1851 treaty shaped the context for 1868, after the Senate reduced the period of annuities from fifty to ten years. Lakotas had never been informed of these changes, let alone agreed to them. At a council in Fort Laramie in 1868, they began by discussing the failure of the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations: "So their intent, for the most part, was to reaffirm the provisions of the old treaty rather than to cede new rights and privileges to the United States under a new agreement."³⁶

The tenor of the talks had already been set in preliminary conversations. On May 28, One Horn, an Oglala, spoke to the U. S. peace commissioners at Fort Laramie:

This Indian country we all (the Sioux Nation) claim as ours. I have never lost the place from my view. It is our home to come back to. I like to be able to trade here, although I will not give away my land. I don't ever remember ceding any of my land to anyone. . . . I see that the whites blamed the Indians, but it is you that acted wrong in the beginning. The Indians never went to your country and did wrong. This is our land, and yet you blame us for fighting for it.³⁷

On the first day of the treaty council, April 28, Iron Shell, a Brulé leader, addressed Generals Harney and Sanborn, and other members of the Indian Peace Commission:

You have come into my country without my consent and spread your soldiers all over it. I have looked around for the cause of the trouble and I cannot see that my young men were the cause of it. All the bad things that have been done you have made the road for it. That is the truth.

He continued with the core of his proposal, "We want you to take away the forts from the country," and he demanded that this be accomplished before winter. Swift Bear, a Brulé, spoke next, "You are making maps of our country and taking it away from us." Referring to the 1851 treaty, he continued, asking that the generals "repeat precisely" his words in Washington, "We want a reservation of land to be surveyed and have fenced off along the White River down to the Whetstone Creek along the Missouri River. We want that land respected by the whites. Protect us and keep the whites off it."³⁸

When talks resumed the next day, American Horse said, "These whites that you have put in my buffalo country I despise, and I want to see them away." He and other Lakota speakers at the treaty council refused to accept treaty goods, asserting Lakota independence from colonial administration, asserting Lakota prerogatives of trade and diplomacy, against imperialist territorialization, refusing to constrain their self-determination under a contract logic. White Crane, a Brulé, continued, "You have no business to come and settle on this land. Go off it."³⁹

A letter reporting to Fort Laramie of the signing of a treaty in November 1868 by Oglala leaders, described Red Cloud, "with a show of reluctance and tremulousness," washing his hands with the dust of the floor. Josephine Wagoner recalled that in old times, people used to throw dirt in the faces of someone who told a story that was too impossible or improbable to believe. Perhaps Red Cloud was commenting on the impossibility and improbability of U. S. stories about sovereign authority over Oglala lands. After the treaty was signed by the U. S. negotiators, Red Cloud voiced his hopes for a future in which, as in years past, "the country was filled with traders instead of military Posts," envisioning the restoration of relations of reciprocity, rather than domination.⁴⁰ Red Cloud's gesture provides a perspective on the Treaty of 1868 that sustained and enhanced Lakota independence and control over their lands, proceeding from the fact of ongoing Lakota modes of relationship.

Lakota oral histories remember the Treaty of 1868 in the breach. Edith Bull Bear testified "the government made a lot of promises it kept for only two years. After that, a lot of the promises were broken." The proof, Bull Bear argued, could be seen more than a century later.

White people weren't supposed to come into our country but even with that in the Treaty they still came in anyway. Look at us, your people are stringing where our land is. The only purposes they came into our land was to take our land, and they are still coming in.

In Lakota memory, Lakotas negotiated the Treaty of 1868 from a position of strength. Severt Young Bear asserted that "the Sioux Nation never sat there with their hands out and said we want peace and friendship; it was the government that came to us and asked for peace and friendship." According to Gordon Spotted Horse, the treaty "is considered to be the final Treaty of the Lakota people," setting out "a boundary which the United States was not to enter under any circumstances." In Vine Deloria Jr.'s analysis of the oral

history, Lakotas "didn't think they were surrendering any rights," and many of them were even resistant to the idea of signing a peace treaty, feeling that they had defeated the United States, and the U.S. was "suing for peace." Deloria concurred, "This was true in many respects; the Lakota were definitely negotiating from a position of strength."⁴¹

Lakota perspectives, from the recorded notes of treaty councils, provide essential context for reading the written text of the treaty. The treaty encoded the perpetual rights of Lakotas to hunt, rights which would be abridged by the mass slaughter of buffalo herds in ensuing years. Following this statement were seven subclauses recording the removal of "any pretense" of opposition to the Union Pacific Railroad, and to military posts built through their lands. Together, the railroad and the military infrastructure left no space for the buffalo, and for people who sustained their communities in relation to the buffalo. Delphine Red Shirt writes of her great-grandmother, "She learned how to make mocassins out of canvas instead of buffalo hide. The buffalo were our lifeline. Once that was cut, we could no longer survive on our own." As Red Cloud suggested at the treaty council, individuals would adhere to it only to the extent that the United States respected Lakota treaty protocols, and Lakota rights to place. As late as April 1869, just a month before the railroads joined at Promontory Point, Union Pacific workers faced attacks from Pine Bluffs to Willow Island, which continued to stall the progress of construction.⁴²

The perspective on the treaty was different from the U.S. side. In the peace commissioners' report on the treaty negotiations, they recorded their initial charge, "If settlers and railroad men would treat Indians as they would treat whites under similar circumstances we apprehend but little trouble would exist."⁴³ If treaty commissioners had themselves treated Lakotas as they would treat whites whose country was under foreign military occupation, they would have gone much farther in addressing Lakota concerns. Those concerns centered on the next phases of imperial infrastructure. The railroad clauses of the 1868 treaty negotiations were especially contentious in a context of the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad right through Lakota lands. Targeted attacks under Sitting Bull's leadership would lead to the halting of Northern Pacific progress. In the years after the failure of the Northern Pacific and defeat of the Seventh Cavalry, the United States would reassert power, policing reservation boundaries as a site of containment, flooding Oceti Sakowin lands with the world's largest system of river dams, through the present, authorizing pipelines to carry volatile toxic sludge from the Bakken tar fields to the Gulf of Mexico.⁴⁴

In a pamphlet circulating among commanding officers in the Department of the Platte to share the details of the 1868 treaty, officers were instructed that "friendly Indians have withdrawn from that country, and you are instructed that hereafter, until further orders, all Indians found there are to be regarded as hostile, and treated accordingly." From a U.S. perspective, rather than institute a future of peace, the treaty forged a zone of war, a spatial perspective on U.S. sovereignty as a project of counterinsurgency. From a U.S. perspective, the rationalization of space along the Platte River, as it took shape through railroad construction, was simultaneously a racialization of space, folding the field of international engagement between Lakotas and the United States into a space of containment, imagined as part of the "national" interior. U.S. counter-sovereignty works by rendering Indigenous peoples collectively vulnerable to violence for remaining on their homelands. From a colonial perspective, industrialization developed in tandem with the transformation of the Platte River country in a shift from international to domestic law. U.S. interpretations of the 1868 treaty were part of the war-finance nexus that shaped the building of the transcontinental railroad, attempting to dress brute conquest in the finery of legality.⁴⁵

George Gap testified at the Sioux Treaty Hearing in December 1974:

From my understanding after the signing of the 1868 Treaty one of the promises that was made was the Union Pacific Railroad was to have only one side of the track right of way. The other side belongs to the Sioux people. The north side of the track, and the north side of the North Platte River will belong to the Sioux people. From my understanding the tract of that land where the track was on was leased out, but I don't know how long, or to whom.⁴⁶

Gap's testimony, more than a century after the 1868 treaty, voices a consistent and living critique, an expansive Lakota mode of relationship that continues to profoundly destabilize U.S. sovereignty and property claims on Lakota lands. Lakota modes of relationship, in 1868, in 1974, and in the present, remain expansive enough to forge relationships with other modes of relationship, but the United States, rooted in expansion and control, can function with the possibility of only one future: liberty and justice, as they say, for all. This should be heard properly, as an imperialist threat.

Chang, *The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 90, 103.

30. Sweeney, *Financing India's Imperial Railways*, 1, 42; Robinson, "Railway Imperialism," 1-4; Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr., "Engines of Empire and Independence: Railways in South Africa, 1836-1916," in Davis and Wilburn, *Railway Imperialism*, 37. A claim by U.S. financial interests for participation in the Hukwang Loan delayed its ratification by the Chinese government: Sun, *Chinese Railways and British Interests*, 105-7, 110-11.

31. Coatsworth, *Growth against Development*, 79, 134, 146; William E. French, "In the Path of Progress: Railroads and Moral Reform in Porfirian Mexico," in Davis and Wilburn, *Railway Imperialism*, 89-90, 94-95; Michael Matthews, *The Civilizing Machine: A Cultural History of Mexican Railroads, 1876-1910* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013).

32. McMurray, *Distant Ties*, 84, 88, 92-94.

33. Davis, "Railway Imperialism in China," in Davis and Wilburn, *Railway Imperialism*, 165; R. Edward Glaeser, "Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Eastern Railway," in Davis and Wilburn, *Railway Imperialism*, 144-46; Sweeney, *Financing India's Imperial Railways*, 90; Susan Strange, *Serling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Christopher Prior, *Exporting Empire: Africa, Colonial Officials and the Construction of the British Imperial State, c. 1900-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 124-25; Tsey, *From Head-Loading to the Iron Horse*, 36, 157-61; Tsey, "Gold Coast Railways," 62, 64-65, 71.

34. For radicalism in a regional context, see Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), chap. 5; On Barak, *On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 176-79, 190-91.

35. Tsey, *From Head-Loading to the Iron Horse*, 114-15; Tsey, "Gold Coast Railways," 96; Richard Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railway-men of Sekondi* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 28-29, 31, 38-39. On Communist internationalism and West African rail workers' leaders, see Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology*, 46-47; Ranger, *Bulawayo Burning*, 152-58; Eric Arnesen, *Brotherhoods of Color: Black Railroad Workers and the Struggle for Equality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

36. Aguiar, *Tracking Modernity*, 74, 84, 87.

37. Dale Kerwin, *Aboriginal Dreaming Paths and Trading Routes: The Colonization of the Australian Landscape* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 170; Moreton-Robinson, *White Possessive*, 140-41.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Luther Standing Bear, *Stories of the Sioux* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 54.

2. In drawing a distinction between Lakota expansiveness and U.S. expansion, and between Lakota modes of relationship and U.S. imperialism, I draw distinctions where Pekka Hämälinen has read similarity. See Pekka Hämälinen, "Reconstructing the Great Plains: The Long Struggle for Sovereignty and Dominance in the Heart of the Continent," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 6, no. 4 (2016): 498.

3. Standing Bear, *Stories of the Sioux*, 3-4.

4. Wazyarawin framed this as a "dramatic loss of subsistence" marked by a move away from wild rice and maple harvesting, pushed under conditions of duress and survival: Wazyarawin, *What Does Justice Look Like? The Struggle for Liberation in Dakota Homeland* (St. Paul: Living Justice Press, 2008), 25-27; Mark St. Pierre and Tilda Long Soldier, *Walking in the Sacred Manner: Healers, Dreamers, and Pipe Carriers—Medicine Women of the Plains Indians* (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 36-38.

5. Douglas B. Bamforth, *Ecology and Human Organization on the Great Plains* (New York: Plenum Press, 1988), 49-52, 79-80; Delphine Red Shirt, *Turtle Lung Woman's Granddaughter* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 16-18; Kevin Gallo and Eric Wood, "Historical Drought Events of the Great Plains Recorded by Native Americans," *Great Plains Research* 25, no. 2 (2015): 157.

6. Standing Bear, *Stories of the Sioux*, 71-74; John C. Ewers, *Indian Life on the Upper Missouri* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 13. Oral histories recall a continuity in the use of horses, and the use of dogs, for community mobility, both innovations of women: Virginia Driving Hawk Sneve, *Completing the Circle* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 10.

7. Robert E. Strahorn, *The Handbook of Wyoming and Guide to the Black Hills and Big Horn Regions, for Citizen, Emigrant, and Tourist, Cheyenne, Wyoming* (Robert E. Strahorn, 1877), 64.

8. Karl Marx, *Capital, Vol. 2* (New York: Penguin, 1978), 471-74.

9. David Wishart, *The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A Geographical Synthesis* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 33, 54, 62-64, 72-73; Jeffrey Oserler, *The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28-32; Douglas McChristian, *Fort Laramie: Military Bastion of the High Plains* (Norman: Arthur H. Clark, 2008), 26-29; Sneve, *Completing the Circle*, 25; Nick Estes, *Our History Is the Future: #NoDAPL, Standing Rock, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance* (New York: Verso, forthcoming).

10. "... the barriers to capitalist production—private property—seem to have fallen, and the entire productive power of society appears to be placed at the disposal of the individual. The prospect intoxicates him, and in turn he intoxicates and swindles others": Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, 180. Andrea Bear Nicholas, "Colonialism and the Struggle for Liberation: The Experience of Maliseet Women," *University of New Brunswick Law Journal* 223 (1994): 231; Colette Hyman, *Dakota Women's Work: Creativity, Culture, and Exile* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2012), 40-41, 43-44, 49-51; Estes, *Our History Is the Future*.

11. Delphine Red Shirt, *Turtle Lung Woman's Granddaughter*, 17; Sneeve, *Completing the Circle*, 11.
12. Sarah Penman, ed., *Honor the Grandmothers: Dakota and Lakota Women Tell Their Stories* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2000), 39.
13. Wishart, *Fur Trade of the American West*, 29; Alan Klein, "The Political Economy of Gender" in *The Hidden Half: Studies of Plains Indian Women*, ed. Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1983).
14. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *The Great Sioux Nation: Sitting in Judgment of America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 41. As Rosa Luxemburg wrote, "capitalism needs non-capitalist social organizations as the setting for its development . . . it proceeds by assimilating the very conditions which alone can ensure its own existence." Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 346.
15. *Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux, etc., 1851*, September 17, 1851, 11 Stats., P. 749; Hiram Chittenden and Alfred Talbot Richardson, *Life, Letters, and Travels of Father De Smet*, vol. 2 (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 675; For Cherokee women's central roles in diplomacy with the United States, see Thecla Perdue, *Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 100-105; Raymond J. DeMallie, "The Great Treaty Council at Horse Creek," in *Nation to Nation: Treaties between the United States and American Indian Nations*, ed. Suzan Shown Harjo (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2014), 97; Richard White, "The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of American History* 65, no. 2 (September 1978), 340-42; Catherine Price, *The Ogala People, 1841-1879: A Political History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 33-36; Hiltending, *Finance Capital*, 66.
16. Ostler, *Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism*, 36-38; DeMallie, "Great Treaty Council at Horse Creek," 101, 105-7.
17. *Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, information in relation to the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at or near Fort Phil. Kearney, in Dakota Territory*, 39th Cong., Ex. Doc. No. 16 (1867) at 16; Wishart, *Fur Trade of the American West*, 54-64, 211-12; David G. McGrady, *Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 25-26.
18. R. Eli Paul, *Blue Water Creek and the First Sioux War, 1854-1856* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 18-24.
19. A young man who would later be called Crazy Horse returned to the village from a hunting trip, to find his relatives mutilated and murdered, a moment that is remembered as solidifying his hatred of colonialism and colonialists: Joseph M. Marshall III, *The Journey of Crazy Horse: A Lakota History* (New York: Viking, 2004), 63-69; Paul, *Blue Water Creek*, chap. 6; Estes, *Our History Is the Future*; Ostler, *Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism*, 39-42; Susan Bordeaux Betteyoun and Josephine Waggoner, *With My Own Eyes: A Lakota Woman Tells Her People's History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), chap. 8.
20. Dunbar-Ortiz, *Great Sioux Nation*, 129; Charles A. Eastman, *Indian Heroes and Great Chieftains* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 3-4; Paul, *Blue Water Creek*, 146-47.
21. On Congressional land allotments and Union Pacific corporate strategy, see J. B. Crawford, *The Credit Mobilier of America: Its Origins and History* (New York: Greenwood Press, [1880] 1969), 25-26.
22. Pacific Railway Act, 37th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 120, 1862.
23. Waziyarawin Angela Wilson, *Remember This!: Dakota Decolonization and the Eli Taylor Narratives* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 6-7; Waziyarawin, *What Does Justice Look Like?*, 38-50; Estes, *Our History Is the Future*.
24. Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, *The Indian Campaign of the Winter of 1864-65*, read to the Colorado Commandery Loyal Legion of the United States at Denver, April 21, 1907, p. 17.
25. U. S. Senate, *Testimony Taken by the United States Pacific Railway Commission* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1887-88), 2589; Report of Jas. A. Evans, of Exploration from Camp Walback to Green River, January 3, 1865.
26. Charles H. Springer, *Soldiering in Sioux Country*, 1865 (San Diego: Frontier Heritage Press, 1971), 37-53, 68.
27. Letter to Grenville Dodge, Fort Laramie, June 17, 1866; Wm. H. Yarthross to Grenville Dodge, Office Ordnance Depot, Fort Kearney, February 12, 1866; Ogden Edwards to D. H. Ainsworth, September 28, 1865, *Grenville Dodge Papers*; *Biography of Major General Grenville M. Dodge* (manuscript), report from Col. W. O. Collins, St. Louis, April 7, 1865, Council Bluffs Public Library.
28. *Union Pacific Railroad, Report of Chief Engineer, 1867*, pp. 3-4. *Union Pacific Railroad, Experiences of Thomas O'Donnell While a Workman in Building the Union Pacific Railroad*. Miscellaneous items from envelope marked "Union Pacific: History" in Nebraska State Historical Society, "North Platte in 1867," 1-5.
29. *Biography of Major General Grenville M. Dodge from 1831 to 1875, Written and Compiled by Himself at Different Times and Completed in 1914*, in five typewritten volumes, p. 388, *Grenville Dodge papers*.
30. *Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, communicating, in obedience to a resolution of the Senate of the 30th of January, information in relation to the late massacre of United States troops by Indians at or near Fort Phil. Kearney, in Dakota Territory*, pp. 2-4; Samuel B. Reed Letters, 1864-1869, August 2, Bitter Creek, Idaho, camp No. 40, August 17, 1864, May 14, 1867, Omaha, May 23, 1867, North Platte, May 27, 1867, North Platte; U. S. Senate, *Testimony Taken by the United States Pacific Railway Commission* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1887-), 2588-89; Sherman to Dodge, St. Louis, January 5, 1867, *Grenville Dodge Papers*; *Biography of Dodge*, 610.
31. *Biography of Dodge*, 611-12; Statement of J. Hudnut's Party, West of Laramie, February 1867 to July 1869.
32. Sherman to Dodge, February 20, 1867, *Grenville Dodge Papers*; "each imperialist power keeps an increasing army available for foreign service; rectification of frontiers, punitive expeditions, and other euphemisms for war have been an incessant progress." Hobson, *Imperialism*, 126.

33. Sherman letter to Dodge, St. Louis, May 7, 1867; Grenville Dodge to W. T. Sherman, Council Bluffs, May 21, 1867, p. Edw. Connor to Grenville Dodge, Stockton, Cal. June 30, 1867, *Grenville Dodge Papers; Biography of Dodge*, 623, 626, 628, 633, 637-38.
34. *Papers Relating to Talks and Councils Held with the Indians in Dakota and Montana Territories in the years 1866-1869* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 52-53; Khalili, 59; Dunbar-Ortiz, *An Indigenous Peoples' History*, 8.
35. *Biography of Dodge*, 648.
36. Dunbar-Ortiz, *Great Sioux Nation*, 144.
37. *Papers Relating to Talks and Councils*, 88-89.
38. *Ibid.*, 8-10.
39. 1868 Treaty talks, 11, 14-15. For a long history of these refusals, going back to the early 1850s, see Estes, *Our History Is the Future*.
40. Josephine Waggoner, *Witness: A Hunkpaha Historian's Strong-Heart Song of the Lakotas* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 45. Head Quarters, Fort Laramie, November 20, 1868, NARA Record Group 393; Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920.
41. Dunbar-Ortiz, *Great Sioux Nation*, 43, 126, 138; Vine Deloria, Jr., "The United States Has No Jurisdiction in Sioux Land," in Dunbar-Ortiz, *Great Sioux Nation*, 143.
42. Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of militarism and accumulation provides a useful and relevant framework to consider the economic function of war against Lakota people and Lakota modes of relationship. Capitalism was reactive to the purely buffalo economy, and enmeshed with it, through militarism. "From the purely economic point of view, [war] is a pre-eminent means for the realization of surplus value." Rosa Luxemburg, *Accumulation of Capital*, 434; Delphine Red Shirt, *Turtle Lung Woman's Granddaughter*, 104.
43. *Papers Relating to Talks and Councils*, 15.
44. Ostler, *Plains Sioux and U. S. Colonialism*, 51-53; Estes, *Our History Is the Future*.
45. Circular to Commanding Officers, Headquarters Department of the Plate, Omaha, Nebraska, October 1, 1868. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places*, 36-47.
46. Dunbar-Ortiz, *Great Sioux Nation*, 161.

CHAPTER FIVE

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2. U.S. 37th Cong. Sess. II, Chs. 25; 27, 1866, pp. 340-41; Robert Schwendinger, "Investigating Chinese Immigrant Ships and Sailors," in *The Chinese American Experience: Papers from the Second National Conference on Chinese American Studies*, ed. Genny Lim (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 1980), 21; Robert Trick, *Ch'ing Policy toward the Coolie Trade, 1847-1878* (China: Chinese Materials Center, 1982), 153; Moon-Ho Jung, "Outlawing 'Coolies': Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of Emancipation," *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (September 2005): 677-701; Moon-Ho Jung, *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 36-38; Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 25.
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