

Reencounters



*On the
Korean
War and
Diasporic
Memory
Critique*

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Durational Memory

What they have survived is an event to be endured,
not a trauma to be healed. It is not part of their historical past,
but of their durational present, and as such is both
unforgotten and unforgettable.

—SEONG-NAE KIM, “The Work of Memory”

In July 2013, I participated in a peace tour of South Korea organized by the Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea. The first of its kind, the four-day trip took place on the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean Armistice. With more than thirty scholars, filmmakers, activists, and artists from Korea and beyond, the tour included visits to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); the bullet-ridden bridge of No-Gun Ri, the site of a 1950 civilian massacre committed by the U.S. military; and Jeju Island, an oblong isle located just off the southwestern coast of South Korea. Reemerging as a popular destination for international tourists during the 1980s and recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization as a World Heritage site in 2007, Jeju is described by the United Nations as a pristine ecosystem encompassing the “finest lava tube system of caves [found] anywhere.” South Korea’s official tourism organization depicts Jeju as an “island full of wonder.”¹

Yet, as was foregrounded throughout our trip, this idealized portrayal of Jeju as an “island full of wonder” myopically obscures a troubling history of multiple militarized colonialisms. A region culturally distinct from the Korean Peninsula, Jeju during the reign of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was openly characterized as a festering hotbed of leftist sentiments and communist activism.² Consequently, the island experienced a seven-year militarized campaign (1948–1955) staged by the U.S.-supported

South Korean Interim Government (SKIG) and its right-wing youth allies against guerrilla forces and the South Korean Labor Party. While statistics vary, most studies indicate that anywhere between fourteen thousand and eighty thousand civilians, or up to one-third of the island's population, were killed during this interval. A microcosm of the violent ferocity unleashed during the Korean armed conflict on the peninsula, the Jeju massacre remains within the periphery of a war that already exists along the edge of public memory. Today, Jeju inhabitants solemnly refer to the massacre as the "April Third Incident" or, simply, "4.3" (*sa-sam*), a reference to the date that marks the official beginning of the massacre, although a handful of earlier skirmishes also took place between the military state and leftist guerrilla forces.³

Recently, the devastating memories of 4.3 have taken on new meanings with the accelerated militarized buildup of Jeju Island. Under the auspices of the U.S. government, which maintains wartime control of the South Korean military, a new \$970 million naval base was completed in 2016 in the coastal village of Gangjeong. Despite the anticommunist sentiments that affix the terrifying "past" of 4.3 to the island's remilitarization, these two events are casually treated by proponents of the U.S.–South Korean alliance as unrelated episodes. More often than not, 4.3 is discussed as an unavoidable military action that halted the spread of communism in Asia, while the new state-of-the-art naval base is perceived as both a tourist attraction *and* a security measure necessary to protecting American interests from China's economic power and North Korean aggression.⁴ For island inhabitants, however, the remilitarization of Jeju not only signals the threat of rekindled warfare in Korea. It also constantly reminds that the past of 4.3 and the Korean War is anything but settled. Hence, acts of mourning for those who died during 4.3 are also critical memory practices associated with one's reencounter with the militarized present and a still undetermined future.

This extended description of Jeju's present-past foreshadows the vital questions pursued in this chapter—namely, what does it mean to remember, reckon with, and recount an atrocious event that is prolonged rather than isolated and discrete? Relatedly, what significances are attached to mourning and memory practices when the "vanished object" in question—in this case, the disappearance of a "unified" or "whole" Korea—is not dead and gone but suspended? Here the mentioning of mourning raises the specter of Sigmund Freud's theorizations of mourning and melancholia.⁵ While Freud portrays mourning as a "healthy" mode of processing insofar as the grieving subject eventually accepts and lets go of loss, melancholia is a pathological stance, since the lamenting subject refuses to relinquish the lost object.⁶ And yet in the case of Jeju Island and the Korean War, this dichotomous paradigm of

mourning and melancholia does not wholly capture the political nuances, emotional complexities, and unique sense of temporal drag that condition an extended conflict. In other words, civilians' fettered attachments to the 4.3 Massacre is less about a pathological identification with a foregone past than it is about a congealed violence that infiltrates the everyday. As Seong-nae Kim, an anthropologist who has written extensively on the 4.3 Massacre, suggests, the violence that Jeju inhabitants endure is *not* an abstracted "trauma to be healed"; nor is it part of a "historical past" that needs to be let go. Rather, the continuing repercussions of war constitute a "durational present" that permeates daily life in "unforgotten and unforgettable" ways in Jeju. Thus, it seems necessary, even urgent, to flesh out the exigency of April 3 diasporic memory practices beyond Freud's dyadic paradigm of mourning and melancholia. In conversation with discussions in the previous two chapters, I mobilize the analytic of the diasporic to highlight dissonant memory practices that share an unsettling relationship with national formations such as Cold War political discourse and national citizenship. More specifically, the diasporic in this chapter signifies how cultural workers delink heterogeneous memory processes from "proper" national sites sanctioned by the U.S. and South Korean governments, ranging from the patrilineal ethnocentric family unit to the realm of (inter)national politics.

To contend with the entwined militarized formations of the 4.3 Massacre and Gangjeong naval base, I draw on two diasporic cultural productions that approach the contemporary "now" as an amplification of forgotten, undead pasts. While Jane Jin Kaisen's multichannel video installation *Reiterations of Dissent* (2011/2016) and Dohee Lee's public performance *MAGO* (2014) are decisively distinct works, both cultural productions are anchored in robust rereadings of Cold War temporality.⁷ Particularly, I am interested in how Kaisen and Lee reencounter Jeju's history through a framework I conceptualize as *durational memory*. Drawing from Seong-nae Kim's theorization of the durational present, which itself reconfigures Henri Bergson's critique of modern renderings of time, durational memories are intentional forms of remembering at odds with the chrononormativity of Cold War historicism.⁸ Reconfiguring the present in relation to the persisting resonance of discordant pasts, durational memory destabilizes the naturalized schematic of successive time catalogued through the temporal logic of then and now. In the case of Jeju Island, linear time segues with the public discourse of national forgiveness, economic prosperity, and resolution. The merging of the past(s) with the present(s) in *Reiterations of Dissent* and *MAGO*, however, upends the spatialized dimensions of time as progressive and inevitable. Placing pressure on the "homogeneous and empty" characterization of modern time tracks how the Korean War's imagined ending hinges on a future incon-

trovertibility: Cold War storytelling presumes that the Korean conflict will end with the definitive victory of the capitalist “free world,” enabled by the collapse of North Korea and its wholesale absorption into a global capitalist infrastructure.

Durational memory, in contrast, insists on a disarray of memories that deviate far from this dominant script. Imagining multiple, even strange and fantastic, temporalities, *Reiterations of Dissent* and *MAGO* generate a complex of subversive memories that refuse to be appeased by state-mediated processes of beautified nation building, forgiveness, and exoneration. Pointing to the limitations of Cold War political discourse, *Reiterations of Dissent* and *MAGO* emphasize three pressing qualities of durational memory. First, these diasporic cultural productions register how the present constitutes competing versions of the past(s) that contradict or are unfathomable to nationalist renderings of time. Second, through the conjuring of heterogeneous pasts, durational memories suggest alternative paradigms of experienced time—or, more precisely, the *durational*—that exceed the contours of Cold War temporality. The durational, as Bergson states, diverges from the mechanization of modern time, which measures temporality through a cyclical range of invariable units, including seconds, minutes, and hours, that then accrue into days, months, and years.⁹ This understanding of mechanized time links to modernizing notions of political and social progress that justify a colonial power’s occupation of other sovereign spaces, such as the United States’ intervention in Korea. The durational therefore marks the conspicuous disjuncture between chrononormative temporality and “immiscible times,” or what Bliss Cua Lim theorizes as “multiple times that never quite dissolve into the code of modern time consciousness.”¹⁰ As further elaborated in this chapter, Kaisen and Lee conceptualize durational memory and “immiscible times” through the aesthetic strategy of remediation.¹¹ While remediation traditionally refers to how “newer” media (i.e., digital media) incorporate and remix “older” media (e.g., analog footage), Kaisen and Lee both deploy this praxis to indicate how multiple temporalities overlap with, meld, and fold into one another. Contextualized this way, the Gangjeong naval base is a historical “remediation” of the 4.3 Massacre.

Third, Kaisen’s and Lee’s reenactments of durational memory accentuate the significance of audiences’ participatory engagement. Note that I resist defining durational memory along the idealized terms of audience “activism”; after all, artwork and performances are always already situated in power-laden spaces regulated by socioeconomic, gendered, and spatial norms. But a willful assertion of the participatory, however imperfect or incomplete, anticipates transient moments of opening necessary for the imagining of decolo-

nized presents and futures. As Judith Butler reminds us, the use of expressive culture to mediate public assemblies underscores the conditions that motivate and impel social action, even as it highlights the enduring dynamisms of power that potentially undermine those very intentions.¹² Hence, attentive to the problematic associations commonly affiliated with reductive notions of “public engagement” and “audience,” I locate *Reiterations of Dissent* and *MAGO* as diasporic cultural productions that foster decolonizing modes of historical remembering unaccounted for by Cold War temporal logics.

The chapter builds on this conceptualization of durational memory in the following manner. The next section discusses Kaisen’s *Reiterations of Dissent* through a historical contextualization of the 4.3 Massacre and the remilitarization of Jeju Island. In conversation with the discursive strategies mobilized in Kaisen’s film *The Woman, the Orphan, and the Tiger* (see Chapter 3), *Reiterations of Dissent* highlights the highly constructed nature of nationalist historiography, as well as the durational memories that exist in relation to and against Cold War chrononormative time. Deploying what Kaisen describes as “dissident” translations of history, *Reiterations of Dissent* recalibrates Jeju’s present through rebellious memories of pasts that defy U.S.–South Korean state discourses of reconciliation and forgiveness. Consequently, Kaisen configures durational memories as a beginning point and clearing ground for the long struggle against remilitarization, not only in Korea, but also in a disparate and vast region commonly naturalized as “Asia and the Pacific.”


The final section of the chapter engages Dohee Lee’s electrifying *MAGO*, a genre-bending multimedia performance that premiered in San Francisco in 2014. *MAGO* combines elements of Korean mythology, modern dance, electronica, and remediated filmic imagery to engulf its audience in an otherworldly environment. Reinterpreting a rich corpus of cosmologic symbols, mythology, and shamanic rituals, Lee approaches Jeju’s remilitarization as a systemic protraction of the 4.3 Massacre. Yet by re-rendering the past as a synthesis between quotidian elements and fantastic symbols, Lee underscores how extant histories of the massacre cannot express the heterogeneous memories of Jeju civilians. By activating durational memories to create a communal mourning ritual, Lee portrays how Jeju inhabitants have endured the brutal force of multiple empires through alternative paradigms of historical narration and becoming. Conversing with Lim’s understanding of the fantastic, *MAGO*’s “out-of-this-world” imagery attests to how a decolonized future remains foreclosed in the confines of a here and now that is faithful to Cold War historiography.

Dissident Translations and *Reiterations of Dissent*

Originally showcased as part of Kaisen's solo exhibition "Dissident Translations" in 2011 in Århus, *Reiterations of Dissent* pulls together a haphazard array of moving images, including U.S. military films, contemporary footage from transnational media outlets, and personal documentation shot by Kaisen in Jeju. Encompassing eight monitors evenly distributed across a semicircle, *Reiterations of Dissent* remediates these moving images into eight looped film shorts, each displayed on a different screen. In these shorts, Kaisen juxtaposes two significant events related to Jeju: the atrocities committed during the 4.3 Massacre and the recently constructed Gangjeong naval base.¹³

The ten-minute film short "Retake: Mayday" remediates black-and-white archival footage first shot by the U.S. Army Signal Corps, an agency responsible for overseeing communication systems in the American military. The military film, catalogued as "Mayday" at the U.S. National Archives, captures a chain of arson fires and fatal attacks that took place in Jeju's Ora Village. Depicting scenes of burning houses, civilians interviewed by military officers, and limp corpses strewn across a rocky plain, this found footage narrates the events as a malicious communist rebellion heroically halted by the South Korean military with support from the United States. Yet Dong-man Kim, a Korean documentary-film maker and one of the intervening voices of "Retake: Mayday," states that these "Americanized" images are meticulously framed to produce the optical illusion of the United States acting as a humanitarian arbiter of justice: "[The film] was created just like a movie set by a particular director . . . the scenes of battle, the burning of the village, and the urgent chase." The depicted fires, in fact, were executed by a cadre of extreme right-wing members of the Northwest Youth League, a paramilitary group trained by the U.S.-backed SKIG.¹⁴

Reiterations of Dissent subverts this historicization by decentering the state as the a priori voice of historical memory and exposing audiences to multiple narratives of the 4.3 Massacre. Pulling apart and piecing the film back together in heavily revised form, "Retake: Mayday" remediates the military footage with recent testimonies and other audiovisual sources provided by massacre survivors, activists, and filmmakers such as Dong-man Kim. In part, the video installation's attention to the manufacturing of South Korea's official version of 4.3 is amplified by Kaisen's references to the meta-qualities of filmmaking. One sequence shows Dong-man Kim in an editing room with two small television monitors. The left-hand monitor depicts a still frame from the Ora fires film featuring South Korean soldiers "protecting" villagers from guerrilla attacks (or so the narrative goes), while the right-hand



Installation view of *Reiterations of Dissent*, ARTSPECTRUM,
 Leeum Samsung Museum of Art, Seoul, 2016.
 (Courtesy of Jane Jin Kaisen. Photograph by Hyunsoo Kim.)

screen displays more recent imagery of exhumed skeletal remains belonging to civilians murdered by SKIG officers and right-wing youth. Producing a split-screen effect, this polarized arrangement hints at how *Reiterations of Dissent* evokes wildly different versions of 4.3 through the juxtaposition of dissonant narrations and temporalities.

In several ways, “Retake: Mayday” exemplifies how Kaisen conceptualizes durational memory in the *Reiterations of Dissent* installation. As discussed at length in Chapter 3, Kaisen’s overarching oeuvre concerns a range of diasporic subjects who contend with the (inter)national politics of Cold War historiography in Western Europe, South Korea, and the United States. A transnational adoptee raised in Denmark, Kaisen describes how her aesthetic sensibilities contemplate queer modes of sociality and remembering at odds with heteronormative categories, including political citizenship and the biological family. While *Reiterations of Dissent* departs from *The Woman, the Orphan, and the Tiger* in its chosen medium and subject matter, Kaisen’s diasporic commitment to the untamable memories of war in excess of national history is evidenced in this multichannel installation, as well.

To start, we might refer back to the title of the artist’s 2011 solo exhibition, which includes *Reiterations of Dissent*, to highlight Kaisen’s reinterpret-

tation, or “dissident translation,” of Korean War historiography. Here the relationship between dissident translation and durational memory deserves some unpacking. For Kaisen, dominant Cold War historiography “translates” the Korean War through the grammar and syntax of familiar phrases, such as American liberation, the free world, and democratic progress.¹⁵ In turn, these semiotic signs depict American military intervention as an altruistic event that “freed” Koreans from the jaws of Japanese colonialism and communism while supporting South Korea’s transformation from a country that suffered from “crushing poverty to one of the world’s most dynamic economies.”¹⁶ This nationalist script subsequently locates 4.3 within a distant past while conveniently occluding recalcitrant memories that do not fit into or align with this historical narrative. In contradistinction, a dissident translation rerenders the contemporary moment through the aperture of persevering pasts that disrupt linear temporality. Specifically, the concept of dissident translation or “translating otherwise” privileges the multifaceted memories of subjects who, more often than not, “embody marginal positions” or reside within transborder spaces, literally and figuratively, as they are frequently crossing or located between national spaces.¹⁷ Self-identifying as a militarized migrant forcibly “transported, accepted, and denied” through overseas adoption, Kaisen approaches translating otherwise as a diasporic mode of memory exploration that maps the difficult historical terrain of violent migration nullified by “Eurocentric understandings of knowledge, memory, subjectivity, and perception.”¹⁸

Consequently, Cold War historiography is provincialized as a *single* interpretation rather than as an objective fact. Reaching far beyond the boundaries of “textual interpretation and mediation from one language to another,” a dissident translation, as Kaisen conceives of the term, is a “political act,” a “condition,” and the “state of being in translation.”¹⁹ In conversation with postcolonial feminist theorists such as Trinh T. Minh-ha and Tejaswini Niranjana, who engage translation as a practice of disruption rather than of continuity, Kaisen’s oeuvre identifies the untranslatable traces between state history and localized knowledges that tell us otherwise.²⁰ As a discursive tool that generates durational memory, dissident translations are therefore diasporic rereadings of continuing pasts that engender multiple interpretations of the here and now.

Aesthetically, Kaisen’s concept of dissident translations closely aligns with her incisive critiques of visibility and her troubling of the recognizable. In particular, Kaisen problematizes the assumed relationality between progressive time and the documentarian rendering of truthful, transparent history through two related methods. First, her works rupture a coherent visual narrative through contradictory images and temporalities that occupy a single

plane of vision (e.g., the television screen). Second, her oeuvre translates vision as a multisensorial process constituted by the sonic, kinesthetic, and tactile. Thus, by multiplying the ways in which the audience reencounters the recognizable visualization of history, *Reiterations of Dissent* questions the terms and relations that underlie representation. While Kaisen carefully acknowledges the damaging power of the image maker's gaze (in this case, the U.S. and South Korean states' omnipresent gaze), her multimedia works emphasize the agentive role(s) played by transnational audiences in the decoding of hegemonic imagery and national history.

To demonstrate the relationality between dissident translation and durational memory, I turn to the structural elements of *Reiterations of Dissent* and Kaisen's use of the multichannel video installation. An art form historically linked to space, corporeality, and the body, video/film installation initially gained traction during the 1960s when artists, including Nam June Paik, experimented with a variety of mediums. Multichannel installation encompasses performance, photography, film, animation, and virtual art, at times being described as a "moving" practice without a methodological essence.²¹ The absence of a unified core of principles has produced diverse works that not only depend on the visual but also tap the sensorial and kinesthetic. The audience-observer might approach a three-dimensional, multichannel installation from a number of perspectives: viewing it from afar, walking around it, or standing close to it. This menu of perceptual possibilities shifts the audience's orientation to produce divergent knowledges.²² Consequently, *Reiterations of Dissent* mimics the contested process of historiographical construction: the installation's screens force the audience to acknowledge the divergent dimensions of narrative making because any single standpoint permits only partial views. The audience must choose which screen to look at initially and which monitor(s) to ignore or encounter at a later moment. Each monitor reaffirms, contradicts, or detracts from the visual and sonic elements that surface across other screens, simulating the entwined processes of memory making and forgetting.²³ In this way, multichannel installation works against the logic of the classical film diegesis, since the multiple screens do not fuse into a coherent sum total but, rather, shatter the very possibility of a single coherent narrative.

Take, for instance, a pair of diametric scenes portrayed in "Lamentation of the Dead" and "The Politics of Naming," film shorts displayed on adjacent monitors in *Reiterations of Dissent*. Although both screens depict contemporary mourning rituals honoring those killed or disappeared during the 4.3 Massacre, they do so in very different ways. In "Lamentation of the Dead," a resplendently dressed *baksu* (male-identifying shaman) mediates the dead to quell their restless spirits. Performed at an unmarked execution site cloistered

in the middle range of Mount Halla, the *gut* (shamanistic ceremony for the dead) is attended by only a handful of witnesses. Because of the pervasiveness of killings during the events of April 3, obscured massacre sites are commonplace throughout the island. The enclosed scene clashes blatantly with the nationally televised state ceremony depicted in “The Politics of Naming,” organized each year since the early 2000s by the South Korean government. In the remediated clip, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003 offers the first state acknowledgment of and apology for the killings. Yet Roh explicitly names the South Korean Labor Party and communist sympathizers as the primary culprits in the massacre. As hundreds of civilians gather at the national public cemetery, the South Korean national anthem plays softly in the background as a mourning crowd hums and lays wreathes and white flowers on grave sites.

Upon closer examination, President Roh’s speech describes Jeju as a shining beacon of human rights and an island of beauty, peace, and leisure. Such portrayals overlap with the South Korean government’s efforts to promote Jeju Island as an alluring vacation spot for domestic and international tourists. Popularly heralded as the “Hawai‘i of South Korea” by South Korea’s national tourism organization, Jeju is cosmetically transformed into a warm tropical island severed from the horrors of the past. Emulating what Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez describes as the seamless merger between the military-industrial complex and the tourist economy, the South Korean Navy describes the Gangjeong naval base as an eco-friendly port that serves as “a new attraction for beautiful Jeju!”²⁴ Ironically, the suggested relation between Hawai‘i and Jeju evokes an enduring present-past: the two islands share a modern history of colonial occupation and continue to serve as U.S. military outposts in the Pacific.

Within the context of state governance, Roh’s apology overlaps with the official policy of “straightening up history” first adopted by President Kim Young-sam’s administration in 1996. As indicated by Seong-nae Kim, the concept of “straightening up” refers to the state’s attempt to purge and clean up South Korea’s sordid past, consisting of sequential military dictatorships and human-rights violations. Yet if we draw on Sara Ahmed’s feminist reworking of existential phenomenology, we might notice how the implied references of directionality and orientation in the policy of straightening up aligns with a selective set of heteronormative expectations characteristic of Cold War time.²⁵ For President Kim and President Roh, the straightening up of South Korean history suggests the “second building” of a virile nation-state committed to, as Seong-nae Kim observes, a “sacred theodicy of anticommunist national unification,” a “moving forward” through a wedded alliance with the United States, and the cultivation of a vibrant national populace

maintained through heteronormative reproductive relations, the gendered division of labor, and blood kinship.²⁶ The straightening up of South Korean history demonstrates how Cold War historiography is intimately bound to and sustained through the persistent force of chrononormativity.

The official state policy of straightening up simultaneously contradicts the lived realities of Jeju civilians and practices on the ground.²⁷ Nearly seventy years after the massacre, the remains of the most prominent resistance and guerrilla youth leaders remain suspended between a here and the after-life, because they are prohibited from receiving burials in public cemeteries and excluded from state-sponsored commemorations. In the absence of government-organized burials, shamanistic *guts* such as the one featured in “Lamentation of the Dead” become alternative requiems. Put differently, *Reiterations of Dissent* translates the *gut* as a durational memory practice that invokes the dead and reconstitutes execution sites as mnemonic spaces of resistance in the here and now. The installation reinterprets sites of state violence as dissonant spaces of “othered” narration and thus embodies durational memories denied by the U.S. and South Korean governments.²⁸ Even today, shamanistic rituals play an important role in public, political, and intellectual life in South Korea and throughout the Korean diaspora—although, as detailed in the subsequent discussion of *MAGO*, they, too, function within and against an overarching system of heteronormative relations and nationalist expectations.²⁹

“The Politics of Naming” further discusses how the administrative practices of publicly recognizing the 4.3 Massacre in South Korea and the United States remain in constant flux. Despite the establishment of a truth commission in 1999, the formal stance of the U.S. and South Korean governments on 4.3 has depended on the administration in power in Seoul. While the camera offers a long shot of silvery tendrils of incense smoke uncoiling from a copper vessel placed at the center of the April 3rd Peace Memorial Park Altar, a narrator, via voiceover, offers the following description: “If you go to the memorial hall of the Jeju April 3 Incident, you can see a sign that says ‘blank memorial stone’ on it. The memorial stone has remained without anything carved on it. It means the people have not named the incident yet.” The absence of a proper name provides sobering commentary on the South Korean and U.S. governments’ wariness of recognizing the 4.3 atrocities as a military-sponsored cleansing. Indeed, as portrayed by the recent actions of conservative South Korean administrations led by Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), the 4.3 Massacre is framed in history textbooks as a necessary counterinsurgency campaign deployed against communist enemies.³⁰ Hence, state discourse crafts the rampant killings as an unavoidable step taken on the hard road to recovery, emancipation,

and liberation from North Korean communist influence.³¹ Linked to the humanist tropes of freedom, progress, and rescue, state-sanctioned violence is galvanized as an essential mechanism of economic prosperity and national security.

Yet Kaisen's use of multiple temporalities in *Reiterations of Dissent* underscores how the narrative of national progress is stymied by the refusal of Jeju inhabitants to forget or move on from the 4.3 Massacre. Civilians, in fact, define the massacre as fundamental to their sense of everyday space and time in Jeju. To demonstrate this, I turn to the film short "Ghosts." In the beginning of the footage, an overhead camera provides an extreme wide shot of Jeju's majestic geography, replete with the snow-capped mountaintop of Halla, a luminous crater lake, and a screeching crow fluttering in the distance. The frame then jumps unexpectedly to a second sequence of medium-shot scenes, depicting a windswept forest tucked away in a mountain cavity captured by a shaky portable camera. The sudden change in scale moves the audience from aerial observation to a more intimate location that transforms the camera lens into the observer's eye. The forest scene is stitched to the aerial frame through a single ominous figure: a black crow, which, by the next sequence of shots, has multiplied into a rapturous flock. Amplified by the quivering treatment of the camera, the frenetic movement of crows in the forest materialize in different tempos, ranging from slow motion to normal time, back to slow motion. Characteristic of *Reiterations of Dissent* as a whole, the rendering of plural time attends to the different temporalities that dwell in and constitute daily life in Jeju. Through this multiplicity, Jeju is reinscribed as a *heterotopic* space in which different temporalities exist and unfold within bounded sites.³² During the height of the 4.3 Massacre, between 1948 and 1950, the cavernous tunnels, forests, and open meadows of Mount Halla were particularly macabre sites, as the SKIG military and the Northwest Youth League executed massive numbers of villagers, suspected communist sympathizers, and family members of leftists.³³

In another scene, the camera closely tracks a bucolic field carpeted with swaying strands of golden grass and large porous rocks—the same terrain that decades earlier bore the bodies of murdered civilians. A solemn voice pierces the screen: "When I was little, I saw those things, and my heart felt sad. During the Korean War, the slaughter of 4.3 continued because war itself is killing. Thus, we never talked about 4.3. In my childhood, I did not hear much about 4.3. I just heard adults who gathered around in their spare time, or on someone's sacrifice day, whispering about the 4.3 victims." This narration produces a profound sense of disassociation, not only between what is seen (a rustic landscape) and heard (a description of gruesome body parts) but also among discrepant forms of knowledge negotiated by civilians. Although

the speaker readily points to the regime of silence imposed on 4.3 survivors (“We never talked about 4.3. . . . I did not hear much about 4.3”), he also provides discrepant memories that disrupt such silence (“When I was little I saw those things. . . . [T]he slaughter of 4.3 continued. . . . I . . . heard adults . . . whispering”). The conflicting impressions make perceptible the pressure points that impinge on the speaker. On the one hand, the narrator, now an adult, is able to speak of the secrets he was forbidden to know as a child. On the other hand, decades of enforced silence have produced excruciating tensions that are difficult to discard. In an attempt to recount the horrors he witnessed as a child, the narrator makes audible durational memories that refuse to desist.

The rampant killings alluded to in “Ghosts” take hypervisible form in the film short “Island of Endless Rebellion,” which remediates archival footage that portrays dozens of bloated corpses left to disintegrate in Jeju’s open air. These disturbing images dovetail with more recently shot footage that depicts archeologists recovering nearly four hundred skeletal remains during a massive excavation at Jeju International Airport in 2007.³⁴ While the workers gingerly disinter matted hair, teeth, and femur bones from the freshly dug site, the camera captures the faces of anguished family members and elderly survivors as they hover anxiously over the excavation site. The delicate act of exhuming bone shards from beneath the earth’s surface and the sudden exposure of those shards generate a discombobulating tension between silence and disclosure. Actively suppressed by the U.S. and South Korean governments for nearly half a century, a formal investigation into the 4.3 atrocities was finally launched in the late 1990s due to escalating pressure from survivors, pro-democracy groups, journalists, and engaged academics. Despite these efforts to make this violence perceptible in relation to the island’s remilitarization, the 4.3 Massacre remains an incidental event in South Korean history. Survivors, bystanders, and witnesses still live side by side with former paramilitary officers and participants who perpetrated or benefited from these atrocities. *Reiterations of Dissent*’s documentation of the exhumation process registers this core contradiction: while the South Korean government frames 4.3 as part of a reconciled past, the recovered remains of those disposed by SKIG and right-wing youth repudiate such idealized claims.

Against this backdrop of violent amnesia, the oppositional imagery of *Reiterations of Dissent* aims to translate otherwise. In “History of Endless Rebellion,” vocal protests related to the 1948 presidential elections in Korea are remixed and remediated. During the presidential elections held in Korea on May 10, 1948, Jeju emerged as the only region in the country to overwhelmingly resist plans for separate elections held in the North and South, with more than 80 percent of the island population voting against such plans.

Jeju civilians also organized a demonstration on March 1, 1947, protesting the presence of the USAMGIK. Some historians cite this demonstration as the actual beginning of 4.3, since the South Korean police opened fire on the crowd, killing six and critically injuring several others.³⁵ While several narrators in “History of Endless Rebellion” describe the 4.3 Massacre as a “continuation of [Jeju’s] traditional resistance,” archival imagery captures a lively group of protesters carrying a banner etched with the words “Immediate Withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet Armies” in English and Korean. The protest against *both* American and Soviet occupation underscore civilians’ recognition of Korea as a strategic geopolitical location within Cold War polemics and their desire to distance themselves from this bipolar world order. Many Jeju residents assign responsibility for the violence of 4.3 to the United States, as redacted government documents reveal how the American government materially supported and maintained vigilant tabs on the atrocities committed during the 4.3 Massacre.³⁶ Taking stock of the U.S. military’s presence in Jeju Island before, during, and after 4.3, the narrators of “History of Endless Rebellion” explicitly name the American government as the primary perpetrator of crimes: “[The 4.3 Massacre] was before the establishment of South Korea. It occurred under the American occupation forces.”

Considering Jeju’s durational past, *Reiterations of Dissent*’s pairing of the 4.3 atrocities with the Gangjeong naval base symbolizes how U.S. geopolitical interests still inform “peacetime” military buildup. Although 4.3 and the Gangjeong naval base are distinct historical formations, they are materially connected through American global interests secured through the continued division of Korea. Following the U.S. military’s return of the Camp McNabb military base to Jeju’s local government in 2006, Gangjeong Village was almost immediately selected by the South Korean state to house a new naval base complex in 2007.³⁷ As the Korean/American activist Christine Ahn attests, the proposed base is a repercussion of bipolarized perceptions, since continued militarism is associated with the U.S. state’s desire to eradicate communism from the Korean Peninsula and to counter China’s economic growth.³⁸ Although the Gangjeong naval base is under the official aegis of the South Korean state, the site’s designation as a U.S. cooperative security location, or a facility that is “not technically ‘American’ . . . but gives [the U.S. state] political cover in localities,” places Gangjeong squarely in the hands of the U.S. Armed Forces.³⁹ Under the current iteration of the Mutual Defense Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and South Korea, the U.S. state is able to mobilize South Korean military facilities at its own discretion.⁴⁰ Subsequently, the high stakes of American involvement in Gangjeong are evident. According to Ellen O’Kane Tauscher, the former U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, the



Still image from *Reiterations of Dissent*, ARTSPECTRUM,
 Leeum Samsung Museum of Art, Seoul.
 (Courtesy of Jane Jin Kaisen. Photograph by Hyunsoo Kim.)

Gangjeong naval base responds to the U.S. request that the South Korean military create an integrated regional missile defense system as a means to maximize “allies’ . . . strategic flexibility.”⁴¹ Currently, the base is outfitted with an Aegis ballistic missile defense system, including twenty warships, submarines, and an American-designed missile-intercepting system.

Reiterations of Dissent uses archival imagery and more recent televised footage to identify the continuities rather than breaks that affix the 4.3 Massacre to the Gangjeong base. The final scenes of “History of Endless Rebellion” depicts SKIG armed vehicles barreling through Jeju’s narrow streets, the burning of *hanok*-style homes, and Jeju civilians frantically fleeing from their villages. Bookending these remediated black-and-white clips are contemporary moving images of corporate Daewoo bulldozers tearing into Gangjeong’s shoreline and slow-motion film of international solidarity activists and Jeju civilians such as Gangjeong’s Mayor Kang Dong-Kyun angrily clashing with South Korean police. In these scenes, a voiceover pithily clarifies the linkages among the United States, the 4.3 Massacre, and the remilitarization of the island: “Standing at a distance, the United States subjugated without getting blood on their hands at all, that was 4.3. The naval base is a continuation of this.” The camera’s lingering on and zooming in to Mayor Kang’s expressive face highlights the prominent role that he and other Jeju civilians have played in critiquing military outposts across the Pacific.

The militarization of Gangjeong Village, in other words, not only revives memories of 4.3 but also evokes Jeju’s—and, to a greater extent, Korea’s—

“geopolitical curse” within the history of U.S. militarized imperialism in the North Pacific.⁴² Jeju and Korea occupy vital locations within the global security system, as exemplified by the United States’ “pivot” toward Asia and the state’s rechanneling of economic and military resources into this vast geographical space. This so-called pivot has translated into new military outfits constructed throughout Asia, including the integration of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) in the South Korean city of Seongju in 2017. For former Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, the U.S. government’s (re-)turn toward Asia and the Pacific expresses a commitment to construct a “more mature security and economic architecture.” In turn, this process contributes to American prosperity since U.S. investments in the area, as observed by Clinton, will “pay dividends for continued American leadership.”⁴³ Designated as oceanic sacrifice zones, island spaces such as Jeju, the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Guam, Hawai‘i, and Puerto Rico have endured the devastating imprint and toll of American militarization, including the seizure of indigenous lands, the destruction of local ecological systems, the housing of military bases, and the installment of live-fire training sites.

This heightened focus on the reenergized militarization of the Pacific and Oceania has mobilized Jeju civilians, fostered unexpected political alliances and transnational affinities in and beyond Korea, and generated a wave of organized resistance, including direct actions, letter-writing campaigns to the U.S. and South Korean governments, hunger strikes, and coordinated solidarity protests in Jeju.⁴⁴ Exemplified by the “Save Jeju Now” campaign, Jeju civilians work closely with activists from the United States, Guam, Hawai‘i, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines to contest the presence of the U.S. military across a chain of islands.⁴⁵ These shared experiences of war, (settler) colonialism, and displacement cultivate an affinity-based understanding of security. Deploying “the scales of the (civilian) body” as a set of metrics, affinity-based security safeguards life and the natural environment; procures basic needs, including food, shelter, education, and health; and preserves cultural identifications.⁴⁶ As Mayor Kang stated at the Moana Nui Conference in 2013 in Berkeley, Jeju civilians have learned from the past sixty years of occupation that “peace should be kept by peaceful means.”⁴⁷ Affinity-based security therefore prioritizes *demilitarization* over militarization, *indispensability* over expendability, and *peace* over war.⁴⁸

Reiterations of Dissent points to how the imparted lessons of the enduring past must be reappraised as framing principles that inspire current social movements for Korean decolonization.⁴⁹ That is, rather than relegating the past to the anteriority of history, Jeju civilians confront the 4.3 Massacre as an ethical foundation that informs contemporary solidarity efforts to organize and resist. As David Scott points out, the possibility of a different future is

anchored in the ability to articulate the relationality between pasts and presents so that subjects might partake in a “permanent critique of our historical era.”⁵⁰ For *Reiterations of Dissent*’s multiple narrators, this historical materialist approach resonates in meaningful ways. As one narrator puts it in “History of Endless Rebellion,” the mantra “Jeju Island as Peace Island” is used as part of everyday vernacular in Gangjeong. Through this mundane act, Jeju civilians address the 4.3 Massacre as an unresolved event that will remain until the Korean War is finished. As a narrator poignantly observes in *Reiterations of Dissent*: “To truly pacify those who were killed under false accusation and to console the spirit of the deceased there should be no more war on the island. Longing for those things, we chose the name ‘Peace Island.’” Despite the strategic usurping of “Peace Island” for entrepreneurial purposes in South Korea, Gangjeong villagers’ reappropriation and constant re-sounding of this phrase underscores how durational memories of the 4.3 Massacre motivate transnational antimilitarism efforts in Jeju and Korea.

MAGO and Communal Mourning Practices

In *Reiterations of Dissent*, Kaisen remembers difficult pasts to reengage, or “translate otherwise,” the contemporaneous conditions of Cold War historiography. In turn, these historical reenounters or durational memories motivate social actions oriented toward a demilitarized Korea. Dohee Lee, too, is concerned with how memories of dissonant pasts associated with Jeju Island push against the absolutist renderings of Cold War historiography. Lee shares an intimate relationship with the island: she was born in Jeju and raised there until she was seven. A long-time resident of the San Francisco Bay area, she describes the visceral shock and the sense of déjà vu she felt when she first learned of plans for the new naval base in Gangjeong.⁵¹ In her multi-genre, “six-chapter” performance *MAGO*, Lee resituates Jeju’s past and present as they relate to the island’s position as a negotiating chip within the political stage of global security interests. Yet in perceptible ways, *MAGO* departs from Kaisen’s video installation insofar as Lee mobilizes supernatural figures to mediate violent memories of living pasts denied by the U.S. and South Korean nation-states. Lee conceptualizes the 4.3 Massacre alongside a readaptation of Korean cosmologic symbols, mythological figures, speaking animal oracles, and shamanistic rituals. Her syncretizing of the ordinary and extraordinary dovetails with her critique that the experiences of Jeju civilians remain unheard in the “real” world.⁵²

MAGO’s performance of durational memories and Lee’s use of unhuman forms to narrate human pasts overlap with Bliss Cua Lim’s engagement with the fantastic. In her observations regarding immiscible times, Lim

explains how fantastic formations such as deities are too often disparaged as an “anachronistic vestige of primitive, superstitious thought.”⁵³ However, precisely because of their incongruity with secular notions of modern historical time, these elements illuminate the rationalizing terms that delineate the so-called real from the unreal. The stubborn persistence of the supernatural, or “othered,” ways of being also points to how different sensibilities of history and temporality refuse to be readily ingested by or incorporated into chronological time.

Lim’s articulation of the fantastic as a mode of temporal critique reflects Lee’s understanding of the mythological and folkloric. As Lee explains, the poignant resonance of local mythologies and the folkloric in present-day Jeju registers a continuum of resistance that precedes American militarized presence.⁵⁴ Once an independent kingdom referred to as Tamna (or Tamla), with an indigenously distinct culture, Jeju was absorbed into the Goryeo Dynasty in the twelfth century and became a vassal of the Chosŏn Dynasty in the fourteenth century.⁵⁵ While Chosŏn rulers imposed dominant ideological systems, including Confucianism, on Jeju civilians, these structures did not wholly eradicate or supplant indigenous social, political, and spiritual belief structures; rather, they were “indigenized” by islanders and selectively adapted to local beliefs, practices, and conditions.⁵⁶ Today, islanders still refer to their strong relationships with land and water, as well as their local dialects and mythologies, as distinct cultural elements that distinguish Jeju from the rest of Korea.⁵⁷ Following several generations of political tension and open conflicts between Jeju and Korean monarchical rule, Jeju and Korea were both colonized by Japan in 1910. After the Japanese empire collapsed in 1945, the USAMGIK and the SKIG occupied Jeju Island. Exposed to and ruled by multiple intersecting forms of colonialism (i.e., China, Korea, Japan, and the United States), Jeju today remains part of the South Korean national polity, albeit as a semiautonomous region.⁵⁸

Within this prolonged context of colonial conquest and reoccupation, mythologies and the folkloric for Lee are *not* whimsical cultural traditions or totalizing gestures removed from the everyday. Rather, civilians summon ancestral figures and mythological deities as symbolic restorers of health, healing, and justice.⁵⁹ Lee titled her performance after one such figure: Mago is a female deity associated with the divine acts of creation, healing, and protection in Jeju and Korea. Islanders interpret mythologies that repeatedly sound across time and space as transmitted expressions of survival rearticulated through a highly stylized mode of narration and storytelling. Therefore, Lee’s readapted use of otherworldly figures such as folkloric deities, shamans, and speaking animals throughout her oeuvre indexes how fantastic remediations of unremembered pasts frame persistence and resistance in relation to and

beyond the contemporary present. Lee observes, “Many people [tend to] view myths as ‘fake’ stories, but they revolve around people who’ve tried hard to change society. . . . These mythologies carry everything: changing cultures, environment and ecosystems, ideological belief systems.”⁶⁰ As we shall see, Lee’s readaptation of cultural mythologies and shamanic rituals in *MAGO* also breaks with a complex of social norms and state policies that determine proper mourning and memory practices in Jeju and South Korea.

For José Esteban Muñoz, this imaginative rerendering of divergent pasts suggests a deep longing for a different world beyond “romances of the negative and toiling in the present.”⁶¹ While such conceptualizations are seemingly antithetical to the quotidian, Muñoz argues that magical thinking is “relational to historically situated struggles” because it hints at other ways in which we might (en)counter and know the present-day.⁶² Thus, the collapse between the everyday and the fantastic calls forth expressive symbols, stories of survival, and memory practices that move beyond a present day shaped by a dooming sense of foreclosure or permanent postponement. In a similar sense, I suggest that *MAGO*’s reencountering of pasts through a reconfiguration of mythic and folkloric symbols provides opportunities to envision, live, and actualize beyond a “totalizing rendering of reality.”⁶³ As a mode of durational memory and an alternative method of historical narration, folkloric mythology exists alongside and against national reckonings of proper historical time.

MAGO melds the fantastic and the mundane by pairing the goddess Mago and the shamanic with mundane figures familiar to those who reside in Jeju. In the opening chapter, performed in the Yerba Buena Center’s entrance lobby, Lee appears as Mago, wearing a *haboetal* mask (an adornment affiliated with Korean shamanic rituals) and delicate layers of translucent white paper. Associated with worldly creation and the abundance of oceanic life, Mago drags long tentacles of tapering seaweed-cloth behind her. She moves slowly as her mouth vocalizes indecipherable sounds that are digitally remixed with a cacophony of breaths and guttural pronunciations. In juxtaposing these incongruent sonic echoes with sustained moments of silence, Lee’s performance produces an immersive soundscape that both intrigues and baffles. After a fifteen-minute span, Lee transitions into the second chapter. She sheds the outermost layers of her clothing, as if she is molting loosened and dead skin. Gesticulating frenetically as she erupts into a sequence of rhythmic breathing practices, Lee eventually leads audience members into the center’s auditorium, where they are seated in cascading rows surrounding the main stage.

Throughout the performance, three large screens wrap around the stage: two horizontal cloth screens flank the background, while a vertical screen is



Still image from *MAGO*, Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, San Francisco, 2014.
(Courtesy of Dohee Lee. Photograph by Pak Han.)

lodged in between. At times, the blue-, red-, and black-tinged glows from the rich scenery illuminate and absorb into Lee's porous skin, producing an aqueous melding between artist and projected imagery. At other times, the audiovisual elements of the screens provide a sensuous backdrop that enhances Lee's embodied presence on stage. For instance, throughout the ninety-minute performance, the screen moves from medium shots of Jeju's dewy forests and subaquatic perspectives of ocean life to evacuated aerials of bombed-out landscapes. In each of these scenarios, the contiguity of Lee's body with the haptic "skin" of the screen suggests an intimate meshing between human and nonhuman. This fusion might hint at several effects: the transformation of Asian women's bodies into prosthetic extensions of machinery via global migratory labor or, relatedly, the techno-Orientalist configuration of Asian bodies into "technologically advanced" yet "intellectually primitive" objects. But my description of *MAGO*'s human/nonhuman hybridization suggests a very different possibility. Specifically, I describe how the interfacing between Lee's body and the screen enhances the otherworldly, "supra-human" quality of her performance.⁶⁴ Indeed, not unlike kate-hers RHEE's improvised performance discussed in Chapter 3, Lee's magnetic presence onstage provokes a range of responses and reactions from her audience. And yet, while RHEE produces an unsettling look that forecloses the public's voyeuristic and hypersexualized gaze, Lee's ethereal embodiment suggests an *open* mode

of audience reencounters. The remainder of this chapter focuses on how Lee's hypervisible body mediates decolonizing exchanges with the audience to identify, track, and unravel militarized colonial knowledges.

In the third chapter, "Waterways," Lee alternatively sits and stands at center stage as she sings about Jeju's enduring relationship with land and water, and the natural ecology of the island. Alluding to Mago's presence, each of the three voluminous screens displays filmic imagery of Jeju's coastline dotted with local fishermen. Eventually, the scene transitions into documentary footage of an underwater realm, with the caption "Sea of Jeju" appearing on the right-hand screen. Portraying wavering tentacles of coral and seaweed, and tiny slivers of fish, the teeming oceanscape reflects the submerged perspectives of the *jamnyeo* ("diving woman"), Jeju's celebrated lineage of female sea divers. Today, the *jamnyeo* are frequently referred to as the *haenyeo*, a more common term coined during the Japanese colonial period and later popularized by the Jeju tourism industry.⁶⁵ The stage is inundated with blue-tinged hues of the ocean while Lee undergoes another metamorphosis. She now wears clothing resembling the ritual attire of the *mudang* (female-identifying shaman): gauzy white garments, a head adornment worn by grieving subjects during funeral rituals in Korea, and *hangul*-filled scrolls draped across her chest. Lee performs a *gut*, or shamanistic ceremony, for ancestors to console and communicate with the dead. In particular, she dedicates the ritual to those killed during the 4.3 Massacre, including youth guerrilla fighters and children. As Lee enunciates the deceased's names in a steady tone, *soombri-sori* (high-pitched whistles) made by the *jamnyeo* fill the airy auditorium. Intermittently, Lee stops and lifts her head to look at and acknowledge the felt presence of the audience; in return, audience members nod while others whisper the names of the dead.

The synthesis of Mago, the *jamnyeo*, and the *mudang* registers Lee's reconfiguration of patriarchal mourning rituals enacted for those killed under violent circumstances in Jeju. Similarly to Kaisen's *Reiterations of Dissent*, *MAGO* translates shamanic rituals, or "localized" lamentation work, as a durational memory practice that addresses the unresolved deaths of the 4.3 Massacre in the here and now. Lee's remediation of undead memories through textured references to Mago, the *jamnyeo*, and *mudang* is notable for other reasons. Since the Chosŏn Confucian Dynasty (1392–1910), the work of mourning in Jeju has been associated with patrilineal genealogies of kinship and social status determined by perceived gender, class, and age.⁶⁶ The disappeared, in fact, are not held in equal esteem among the living.⁶⁷ For instance, deceased members removed from reproductive lineages of patrilineal kinship, including young people under fifteen and unmarried women without children, are not provided with formal ancestral ceremonies. Rather, secret ceremonies

known as the *kamaegi morun sikgye* are held within the gendered confines of the home, since mourning is delegated to “women in the family and kinship community.”⁶⁸ Beyond such private ceremonies, these selective cohorts of the deceased are considered aberrant figures who occupy a status outside the normative bounds of blood family and ancestral worship.

More recently, state policies have regulated the practice of mourning for and remembering the dead in Jeju. These policies determine the rule of familial genealogy, or *chokbo* (*jokbo*), in conjunction with kinship through bloodline.⁶⁹ Due to the sheer number of children and young people killed during the 4.3 Massacre, posthumous adoption of the deceased by friends, acquaintances, and others unrelated by blood is a culturally sanctioned practice in Jeju because it provides the dead with social bonds beyond the biological family. However, since the South Korean state’s implementation of the Jeju Special Law of Restitution for the Victims of the April 3rd Incident in 2000, genealogical caregivers are not legally acknowledged and cannot benefit from the law’s provisions, such as medical care and financial reimbursement provided to the family of the dead. As mentioned in the discussion of *Reiterations of Dissent*, guerrilla youth leaders are explicitly excluded from public ceremonies and cannot be buried in state-regulated cemeteries.

Lee’s reconfigured mourning ritual in *MAGO* therefore breaks with these conventions in several ways. In the most obvious sense, the linking of durational memory with mediating figures such as Mago and the *jamnyeo* points to an underlying desire to rupture the privileging of patriarchal figures and patrilineal lines of kinship within contemporary mourning rituals. In part, Lee reroutes the status of Jeju’s forgotten dead in relation to and through “deviant” gendered figures such as the *jamnyeo*. While South Korean popular media and the tourism industry now tout Jeju’s sea divers as feminist iconoclasts and heroines, the *jamnyeo* historically have occupied an outsider status in Jeju society as undervalued laborers belonging to the lower socioeconomic strata.⁷⁰ As peripheral figures who are often the primary breadwinners in their families, the *jamnyeo* negotiate and at times diverge from Confucian gendered roles, which traditionally ascribe Korean women to the domestic realm of the household.

Yet in a more urgent manner, I suggest, Lee’s deployment of fantastic figures symbolizes a wholly different conceptual approach to 4.3 mourning practices beyond the gendered circuit of spatial and temporal norms. In particular, the evocation of supranational deities such as Mago demands a different epistemological orientation around historiography and time. As Helen Hye-Sook Hwang observes, mythological figures in Jeju and South Korea are sociocultural elements that predate or exist outside national formation.⁷¹ Hence, such deities challenge the singularity of South Korean modernity

firmly built on “patriarchal (read Confucian) rules in East Asia” and American anticommunist benevolence.⁷² Within the narrow confines of this modern historical context, the South Korean nation-state is characterized by a naturalized division of gendered labor and intellectual capacities, with cisgender men identified as public and political figures and cisgender women identified as the domestic linchpins of the home and reproducers of the national populace.⁷³ As mentioned earlier in this chapter, we might also reference Cold War historiography’s investments in heterosexual reproduction, the gendered alliance between South Korea and the United States, and a “moving forward” that discards the past as concluded and closed episodes. These gendered principles are not purely discursive or abstract framings; rather, they underpin social and material practices of remembering and mourning in Jeju.

Hence, Lee’s calling forth the names of the “non-normative” dead alongside “non-normative” figures such as Mago hints at a desire for a divergent spatiotemporal mourning paradigm. Through its interweaving of reconfigured mythical symbols and everyday figures, *MAGO* resituates those killed during the 4.3 Massacre within “othered” spaces and spheres delinked from the borders of the nation-state, patrilineal blood kinship, and traditional mourning time and space. Lee’s revised performances of *MAGO* across an arrangement of performance venues, academic conferences, artists’ gatherings, and antimilitarization events in North America (the United States and Canada), Asia (Japan, Korea, Jeju Island), and the Internet provide opportunities for the living and disappeared to co-inhabit diasporic and virtual spaces that exceed domesticated social codes that traditionally bind mourners to the deceased in Jeju.⁷⁴ Resonating in some ways with Diana Taylor’s theorization of the mnemonic practice of “DNA,” or the ethical performance of *social* (rather than national or ethnocentric) bonds among gathered participants, Lee’s re-sounding of names in *MAGO* reassures the “deviant” dead that they “are neither forgotten nor ‘surrogated’” and that “no one else will take their place.”⁷⁵

In part, Lee’s insistence on enumerating the dead within a performative space depends on her conceptualization of the audience as members of and contributors to a communal ritual practice. Indeed, Lee invites her audience to become observing participants rather than passive spectators or consumers of the performance. For Lee, the communal mourning ritual departs from a set of prescribed rites performed in a perfunctory or mechanized manner. Rather, the communal ritual is a contingent, open-ended mode of communication that takes place in and through the performance space. Within this context, Lee identifies herself as the primary mediator of emergent and, at times, skeptical and contentious interactions with her surroundings. In return, Lee addresses her audience as varied participants in the performance,

whether or not they perceive themselves in that way. As Lee notes, this distinct approach to performance does not appeal to all audience members; in fact, it triggers contrarian and pessimistic reactions. However, these “negative” responses push Lee to contend critically with the discursive possibilities and limitations of her artistic praxis while also dispelling idealized notions of a homogeneous participating audience. Differentiated audiences, in other words, constitute a key component of Lee’s aesthetic praxis as a multimedia performance artist.

This fluctuating relationality between the artist and audience resonates with Frazer Ward’s rigorous reassessment of performance in relation to public participation. Refusing to overgeneralize the audience as a “like-minded group” of “innocent bystanders,” Ward nevertheless is interested in the subjective conditions that underpin the making of a temporary “we” (or multiple “we’s”) through the performative act.⁷⁶ For instance, within the confines of social and economic conditions, audience members decide whether to attend a particular performance, engage the artist if invited to participate, stay or leave during the event, or contemplate the performance’s political and affective impact following its live iteration. While underscoring the artist’s role in determining the conditions of spectatorship and reception, Ward refers to these qualities as the “ultimately ethical dimensions” of performance.⁷⁷ Here the ethics of performance are less about the idealized relationships, sentimental values, or overlapping intentions shared by artist and audience than about the potential ways in which different performances generate dynamic opportunities to confront a working set of critical questions and assumptions.

These ethical dimensions of performance touch on an earlier observation about durational memory. For both Kaisen and Lee, durational memory remediates the present to directly confront the living past(s) of the Korean War. Rearticulating divergent pasts as part of a here and now, durational memory provides a discursive framework for articulating the relationship between the present and the still undetermined future. Along this vein, a communal mourning ritual for Lee provides a zone of emergent (re)encounters that does more than illuminate how unrelenting violence persists in everyday life. The dialogical moments forged between artist and audience, at their most fruitful, engender unanticipated pathways for dialectical inquiry and mutual moments of historical reexamination. In turn, Lee encourages her audiences to consider their differing knowledges of and relationships to militarized violence in and beyond Korea.

The participatory potentials of durational memories are most evident in the last few chapters of *MAGO*, in which Lee squarely situates Jeju’s remilitarization within the context of the 4.3 Massacre and the continuation of the Korean War. In the fourth chapter, “Journey,” Lee remediates a minute-

long segment of black-and-white military archival footage that appears on all three stage screens. The film features a huddle of young and elderly civilians arrested by American and SKIG soldiers, a young refugee with shell shock, and a lifeless Korean civilian killed during a bombing raid. Resembling the cinematic technique of flashback, the remediated footage is looped for several minutes to amplify how the present, as Maureen Turim states, “returns to” and “dissolves to an image in the past.”⁷⁸ Yet the juxtaposition of this filmic flashback with the embodied presence of a quivering Lee who remains at center stage during the filmic sequence intimates a different order of temporalities: perhaps it is the *past* that remains in and dissolves into an image of the *present*. At the end of the segment, Lee underscores this reversal by speaking directly to the audience, addressing them with the following repeated phrase: “Sixty years and it still continues. Sixty years and it still continues.”

In the penultimate chapter, “Invited Ritual: Crow,” Lee engages the audience even more pronouncedly. During the act, Lee impersonates the Jeju black crow, an animal associated on the island with obscured memories and misfortune. Surrounded by imagery of crows sitting on the sprawling branches of leafless trees, Lee walks across the stage at a frenzied pace, with tufts of black feathers framing her face. As I discussed in my analysis of *Reiterations of Dissent*, the crow is commonly interpreted by civilians as the only creature to have witnessed the flurry of mass executions that decimated the island populace during the 4.3 Massacre. Lee’s personification of the crow registers other significations, as well. Within Korean mythology, fantastic renditions of crows, such as the *samjok-o* (three-legged crow), are affiliated with the omniscient power of the sun, trickster propensities, and prophetic powers. Within this folkloric context, crows assume divinatory powers, as they are able to visualize the past and foretell the future. *MAGO* readapts this mythological rendering so that the crow symbolizes a concrete link to the undead past, the continuing present, and the unrealized future: for Lee, the crow as witness represents the restless spirits of those murdered on the island, even as the animal oracle converses with the audience about the unfortunate conditions of the present and the open-ended potentials of the future.

At the beginning of “Invited Ritual: Crow,” representations of Jeju’s unrequited spirits take material form as a choir of other performers, donning eerie white masks, encircle Lee onstage. Punctuated by moments of silence, Lee’s address to the audience begins by repeating two questions: “What did you see? What did you hear?” Shifting her gaze across the expanse of the auditorium, Lee continues to press the audience. “What did you see? What did you hear?”

Circumambulating the stage and approaching audience members seated in the two front rows, Lee continues to ask until a chorus of echoing answers is heard across the auditorium: “colonialism,” “bombs on my grandmother’s



Still image from “Invited Ritual: Crow,” *MAGO*,
Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, San Francisco, 2014.
(Courtesy of Dohee Lee. Photograph by Pak Han.)

house in Iraq,” “police brutality [in the United States],” “airstrikes in Gaza.” As Lee pursues the questioning, a layering of responses fills and overwhelms the space. Toward the end of this nearly seven-minute segment, the simultaneous answers become indistinguishable, enmeshed. For Lee, this reciprocated practice of listening and response within the performance space fosters a horizontal sense of social relationality distinct from identitarian formations anchored in the biological, national, and ethnocentric. Within this participatory exchange, Lee draws on Jeju as a specific example of militarized violence; in response, audience members identify different forms of racialized, gendered, and sexual violence that they know of or have witnessed. Upon closer examination, the geographical spaces recounted by audience members in this rendition of *MAGO*—from the United States to Iraq and Palestine—gestures to a form of subversive knowledge as these evocations expose how dispersed acts of militarized warfare are not at all isolated or exceptional. Rather, Lee’s performance underlines how militarized violence disproportionately affects racialized and gendered communities deemed disposable, non-essential, or superfluous to the project of international global security. As a result, dense concentrations of loss and death generate a diasporic matrix of necropolitical spaces shaped by the structural violence of American military intervention and colonial occupation.

Through this actualization of durational memory, the audience's shared examples illuminate how Jeju's durable past depends on America's extensive history of domestic racial terror and international warfare consolidated through military security outposts and "black sites" scattered across the United States, the Americas, the Middle East, and Asia.⁷⁹ The responses from the audience therefore suture domestic racial violence committed "right here" in the United States to the militarized violence committed "over there" in Korea and elsewhere. For Lee, these vocalized connections impel her interlocutors to resituate militarization within a global geography of war, imperialism, and occupation that radiates across a concatenation of seemingly disjointed sites:

It's not just Jeju. It's these other places, too. Different countries [such as the United States] have immense power to take away life and land. They do what they want to do. So people in the performance realized that they and I were not only addressing [Korea's history], but we were also talking about the present moment and how colonialism lives in so many places. We experience, see, and hear all of these things, but sometimes we don't talk about it; we don't make the connections. So by asking people, "What did you hear? Can you tell me what you saw?" I didn't want to lecture to people, but I wanted them to listen and speak to one another.

By narrating Jeju's multiple histories of militarized colonialism through a reconfiguration of cultural myths and symbols, Lee renders perceptible the sedimentation of slow violence beyond paradigms of national and progressive time. Ultimately, these variable references to militarized presence in Jeju do not rectify or resolve the devastation wrought by the Korean War and other U.S.-initiated wars across different sites. Instead, *MAGO* attempts to reorient the audience toward a decolonial disruption of Cold War historiography. More specifically, Lee's conjuring of alternative historical framings and fantastic approaches to (un)knowing Jeju's fraught history is a decolonizing tactic, because *MAGO* pulls apart established narratives of national progress anchored in militarized violence and insecurity. *MAGO*, however, does not merely intervene in dominant narrations of Cold War history. As a facilitator of durational memories, *MAGO* engenders a transnational geography of diasporic affinities shaped by distinct yet interrelated experiences of militarized colonial violence and American occupation.

Marked by an extended moment of silence, Lee draws "Invited Ritual: Crow" to a close with a final overture to her audience: "Open your eyes. Open your ears."

Coda

This chapter conceptualizes durational memory within the context of the Korean War and Jeju's extended history of militarization and multiple colonialisms. Focusing on how memories of heterogeneous pasts underpin the here and now, it examines how *Reiterations of Dissent* and *MAGO* actualize divergent temporalities that push against the linearity of Cold War historicism. While Kaisen's and Lee's works deploy different aesthetic tactics to craft durational memory, both of their diasporic memory productions rely on notions of participatory engagement in their conjuring of enduring pasts. That is, if Cold War national memories approach chrononormative time as a predetermined movement toward the inevitable, durational memories accentuate the open-ended, pluralistic elements of diasporic revisionary historiography. For Kaisen and Lee, durational memory is a vacillating (un)remembering process that overlaps with varying notions of the "audience," whether this term refers to actual bodies within a performance space or a "sense of community as a horizon of experience that is anything but empirical."⁸⁰

To close, I return to a vignette offered at the opening of this chapter regarding my visit to Jeju Island with a group of scholars, activists, and artists in 2013. During our day-and-a-half excursion to the island, we visited Gangjeong Village, the site of South Korea's new naval base, and Jeju City, home to the April 3rd Peace Memorial Park that houses a monument dedicated to those killed during the 4.3 Massacre. The monument, a rectangular concrete stone placed inside a beautiful domed hall, remains unadorned, unnamed. As on-site docents explained, the monument has no official inscription because the historical definition shifts in accordance with the ebb and flow of U.S. and South Korean political governance. In the past twenty years alone, 4.3 has been described as a "counterinsurgency campaign" and "communist rebellion," as well as a "people's uprising" and "civilian massacre."

While some residents have pressed for an inscribed title, the memorial's staff are hesitant, given the divergent memories of the 4.3 Massacre. Several trip participants also remarked that such a definitive act would block or stymie critical remembering. When I privately asked one of these participants what she understood as "critical remembering," she described a process in which the past is redefined as a crucial component of the present. For this participant, the official naming of the memorial stone as a tragic remnant of the past would sever the ties between the 4.3 Massacre and Jeju's current process of remilitarization. Commenting on the "power contingencies of memory," this participant referred to how the unnamed stone constantly reminds of the "inconvenient" memories purposefully expunged and dis(re)-membered by South Korean and U.S. national history. To me, the unnamed



Unnamed 4.3 monument stone, April 3rd Peace Memorial Park,
Jeju City, Korea, July 2013.
(Photograph by the author.)

stone also serves as a sobering reminder that the Korean War remains un-ended, unfinished.

My colleague's poignant descriptions remind me how the unnamed stone embodies the potential, even hopeful, dynamisms of durational memory. The monument's adamant *refusal* to be named does not signify an erased past; nor does it symbolize a universalized history that transcends all moments in time. Rather, by insisting on the animated relationality of past(s), present(s) and future(s), the stone's "blankness" underscores how the politicized terrain of remembering underscores a future (or futures) that is not yet determined. Within the highly contested realm of remembering and forgetting the Korean War, durational memory foregrounds how a reorientation of the past(s) in conjunction with the present can induce, as Scott suggests, "a politics for a possible future."⁸¹ Thus, even while they direct us to pasts that have long been rejected and denied by the state, durational memories foreground the unknowing, contingent, and anticipatory qualities of the present and future.

An Opening

Wreckoning

*A sunlit hike
along the coastline*

*rift of the Pacific
rearranging
our view.*

*Spring rush—
wild fennel, sage,
rosemary. Bankside
cypresses.*

*All right then,
back to Oakland, horizon
circling the sunset*

*the sun suspended
like a lit balloon.*

5,593 miles from Pyongyang.

Where my grandfather spent time.

*Where my family
might have lived*

*had it not been
for division.*

Where.

*Cotton shirts wet
from summer
sweat.*

*Not unlike
New York in August, but without
garbage's soiled scent.*

*The Taedong River,
emerald and shadows.*

*Short-horned grasshoppers
wedding air, distracting*

*couples who are stretching
their legs, lingering*

*near water—last days
of summer.*

*Twilight. A bridge. Reminding
me of a summer*

*where I haunted
bridges, seeking summer walks
cooled by evening.*

Not unlike tonight.

*Headlights' beams
catching bow waves.*

*People
coming back home*

*after a day
in the office, factory, the fields.*

"Reunification Road"

122 miles between Seoul and Pyongyang.

*Google tells me that in a plane moving 560 miles per hour
the trip would take 22 minutes.*

Walking, five to six days.

I've stood on this road before.

*A dust-turn path boarded
by the sky.*

The demilitarized zone.

Aerial view: roofs of sky blue houses resembling arrows.

Cameras keep watch.

*American, British, German and Australian tourists
pay to have a close-up view from
the South Korean side.*

*“Unification Hill (Odusan Unification Observatory): A venue for
education on security matters, Unification Hill is situated where the
Hangang River and the Imjingang River meet. At Odusan
Unification Observatory, you can also [pay to] observe the daily lives of
North Koreans.”*

*I have walked through
these grounds.*

A soldier tells me,

*This is bruised land, scarred land,
but our land. In each*

*blue house, a blue line
is drawn across the carpet, not unlike*

*the division created
by my second-grade teacher*

*designating the classroom's “noisy” zone
from the “quiet” zone.*

This time, if I cross, I will be shot.

*How much a body can
and cannot change things.*

*A body crossing this blue line
staying flesh.*

*I am not a Phoenix breathing fire
to blaze the land*

into cinder, ash, craters.

*But, after seventy years of separation,
a crossing body*

*that does not transform, destroy, decimate
might feel like an indictment?*

A waste.

A lie deformed into many truths.

*Nation-states
are born from blue tape*

*governing lives,
separating families, silencing
the familial to echoes.*

*Sleeping in phosphorescent
blue light.*

*How scatological logistics
transform a room into*

a site of an unending war.

—CRISTIANA KYUNG-HYE BAIK, March 2018

To Locate

A lie deformed into many truths.

The following is an excerpt from a *Jimmy Kimmel Live* episode filmed at the Hollywood Walk of Fame in Los Angeles, California, in 2017:

Question: Do you believe the United States should take military action against North Korea?

Answer from pedestrian: I would say yes, for sure.

Question: And where exactly is North Korea?

Answer from pedestrian: What, on the map? I don't know. I'm horrible at geography.

As the broadcaster asks these questions, hearty laughter from the audience is audible. Throughout the four-minute segment, several pedestrians and onlookers provide similar answers.

At the end of it all, no one is able to identify the location of North Korea or the Korean Peninsula on the color-coded map.

To Know with Certainty

*Where my family
might have lived*

*had it not been
for division.*

Where.

What do you know about North Korea? is the question I posed to —, —, —.

Before hearing their answers, I anticipated the responses.

*Axis of Evil
Human rights violator
Torturer
Deluded
Brainwashed
Communist
Poverty
Famine
Defectors
Black Hole
Third World*

But how do you know this to be true? is the second question I posed.

People stare with blank expressions.

Turn on the news.

Respected news outlets such as the New York Times report these things on a weekly basis.

North Koreans, they want things that everyone wants—it's not their fault they live under a dictator.

To See, to Master

Aerial view: roofs of sky blue houses resembling arrows.

Cameras keep watch.

*American, British, German and Australian tourists
pay to have a close-up view from
the South Korean side.*



A View From Above

In a 2006 press briefing to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. secretary of defense from 2001 until 2006) referenced a satellite image of Korea that depicts the peninsula's light footprint in a truthful manner. While the southern half of the peninsula is mapped by crisscrossing arteries of white veins and bright circular bulbs that signify dense concentrations of electricity and light, the northern half is almost all shadow, almost completely dark.

In response, Rumsfeld states that this is his favorite photograph of all time, excluding the photographs of his wife and family: "It says it all. That's the south of the Demilitarized Zone, the same as north, same resources north and south, and the big difference is in the south it's a free political system and a free economic system."¹

Today, the accumulation of captured wavelengths correlates with one's liberation, happiness, and freedom.

In conjunction with these perceptions, an arrangement of other considerations.

A General Sketch

*Sleeping in phosphorescent
blue light.*

U.S. Defense Strategies from Above (Aerial Views Are Imperative):

Air Pressure

Saturation Bombing

Precision Bombing

Scorched-Earth Policy

Enclose, Close Off, Suffocate

Napalm Dust

A Belt of Radioactive Cobalt

Destruction Radius

A General Sketch *(continued)*

*I am not a Phoenix breathing fire
to blaze the land*

into cinder, ash, craters

Calculations (estimates)

635,000 tons of American bombs dropped in the north

32,557 tons of United Nations–endorsed napalm dropped in the
north

Results

3,000,000 civilians killed, the majority concentrated in the
north (my family and the families of friends are nestled
somewhere in these numbers)

8,700 factories destroyed in the north

5,000 schools destroyed in the north

1,000 hospitals destroyed in the north

600,000 buildings destroyed in the north (in 1953, only two
buildings remained standing in the capital city)

A journalist was recorded as saying: *Every city is a collection of chimneys.*

These strikes continue through diplomacy, including U.S.- and
UN-approved food and trade sanctions.

Questions for Numbers

What do numbers remember?

Do numbers relay the true essence of American violence and the force it took for the United States to nearly obliterate a sovereign nation that it considered (still considers) a pesky thorn on its capitalist side?

Would vocalizing these numbers, out loud, challenge U.S. media coverage of North Korea?

If numbers are not convincing enough, how else might we craft a counter-history that is more factual, more believable to Americans?

Questions *(continued)*

Do statistics embody the fleshed traces of the pain, fear, panic, chaos, anger, madness produced by war?

Do numbers correspond with the sheer determination it takes to rebuild a society left in ruins, even under the promise of future bombs?

Do numbers help us to see more clearly? If so, what is it that we're seeing?

Is it possible to reduce the dead to statistics? (I hold myself accountable to this question.)

What must one do to ensure that they will never be vulnerable again to American military strikes?

An Earnest Attempt to Search

122 miles between Seoul and Pyongyang.

*Google tells me that in a plane moving 560 miles per hour
the trip would take 22 minutes.*

When I searched for “North Korea” on Google, the search engine’s Page-Rank (PR) algorithm generated 3,710,000 results in .71 seconds. The generated links are a composite index and a constantly evolving snapshot of the keyword’s “vital pulse” in the realm of virtual information. The progressive order of websites that appear on Google is determined by the following factors:

1. The frequency and location of a keyword on a web page.
2. The length of time the websites have existed.
3. The number of “touches” or links associated with each site.

The sites that appear first on the search list are considered the most relevant, the most important. Here in the United States, Google searches are determined by the PR algorithm—a calculation designed by Lawrence Edward Page (a corporate executive, Internet entrepreneur, and multibillionaire) for maximum returns.

On April 13, 2018, the top-generated links are as follows:

“UN Appeals for Aid to North Korea as Donations Drop” (*Wall Street Journal*)

“They Escaped from North Korea: Personal Stories and Mementos of Defectors” (*ABC News*)

“Pompeo says he can imagine a ground invasion of North Korea” (*Axios*)

“North Korea” (*Wikipedia*)

“Trump’s Syria Threats Why North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons” (CNN.com)

“North Korea Revealed” (Reuters.com)

“North Korea Fast Facts” (CNN.com)

Last Impressions

To feel in solidarity with him or to build with him or to like what he does, it is not necessary for me to grasp him. It is not necessary to try to become the other (to become other) or to “make” him in my image.²



A space in outstretched time



Waiting




Fields



Heartbeat



(Un)detected



*governing lives,
separating families, silencing
the familial to echoes.*

*Sleeping in phosphorescent
blue light.*

*How scatological logistics
transform a room into*

a site of an unending war.

I am trying to fold race into geopolitics and geopolitics
into poetry. Hence, geopolitical poetics. It involves disobeying
history, severing its ties to power.

—DON MEE CHOI, *Hardly War*³

In *Reencounters: On the Korean War and Diasporic Memory Critique*, I consider the enduring effects and affective antagonisms of the Korean War. Mobilizing diasporic cultural works as aesthetic mediations of memory, this book attunes to a persisting cycle of militarized repercussions indicative of rather than exceptional to the everyday. Drawing on reencounters as a core concept, each chapter examines the routinized elements of daily life, only to foreground their insidious origins. This book demonstrates how Korean militarized migrations are repackaged as American immigration history; how the silences of war congeal into the hardened marrow of familial bonds; how war's human returns become integral to the inner workings of national economies; and how the politics of national forgiveness collapses martial and leisure economies. In so doing, the book examines the terms and conditions of recognition that reconfigure war's manifestations as part of the contemporary moment.

This sense of the Korean War's protraction indicates how the U.S. state recalibrates the enduring conflict as a just and justifiable intervention necessary to maintaining global security and a "free" democratic world order. In effect, Cold War political discourse scripts the Korean War through a teleological lens, underscoring how the conflict will finally end with the North Korean state's demise. And yet the uneasy deferment of such a foreseeable ending troubles this self-evident truth. Specifically, diasporic memory works amplify the temporal disjuncture between the normative expectations of "homogeneous and empty" history and the embodied realities of the Korean War's status as a suspended struggle. Mired within this interval, Koreans and Korean diasporic subjects live in a zone of perpetual waiting and uncertainty.

To be sure, my emphasis on the Korean War's endurance does not aim to attenuate or anesthetize the bruising blow of "slow" militarized violence, which touches lives in distinct yet interrelated ways. Spanning from sharp pains associated with decades-long familial separations to the potential threat of nuclear annihilation on the Korean Peninsula, war reorients us toward its ever diversified forms in the twenty-first century. *Reencounters* with the effects of war intimate how brute forms of violence are conditioned by governmental apparatuses that permit populaces to live—or, conversely, to gradually perish—day by day. As Caren Kaplan notes, the "time and space of contemporary war" is characterized by an inalterable structuring that implicates all of us in the machinery of militarized conflict, albeit in different ways and through different means.⁴

While tracing the blurred boundaries between wartime and peacetime, this book offers no easy (re)solution as to how or when the Korean War will end or whether the U.S. military will end its occupation of the peninsula. However, by suggesting the everyday as a potent terrain in which to return to, reassess, and remember otherwise, the book pushes against the twin logics of inevitability and foreclosure so crucial to Cold War temporality and political discourse. Taking hold of the Korean War's diverse ramifications, I have described how diasporic subjects and spaces treated as disposable excesses by the U.S. and South Korean states resist wholesale absorption or assimilation into national historiographies. Enacting unruly memories, these diasporic excesses, in fact, accentuate the untenable conditions of militarized colonial infrastructures and transnational solidarities that refuse to be limited to the imagined Korean nation-homeland. In part, reencountering the Korean War encompasses a willingness to untether ourselves from enduring tales we have long been taught to know and trust within formal educational contexts, our given families, and social networks. In turn, the evocation of radically different memories orients us toward demilitarized presents and futures that are seemingly impossible or out of reach in the here and now.

Thus, it seems appropriate to conclude this book with my own diasporic memory practices of the Korean War and to partake in a mnemonic praxis of untethering. Strangely enough, the focus of my closing occupies both a central and peripheral place in this book: "North Korea." Here I reference the country in quotations, because the North Korea to which the American public has been exposed for nearly seventy years is a comedic object refracted through the polarized lens of Americanized Cold War discourse. Forever demonized by the U.S. government as the sole culprit of the Korean War and a heartless violator of human rights, North Korea is also a common punchline on late-night television shows, in slick studio films, and in documentary exposés. Given Americans' limited access to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea occupies a perplexing place within the U.S. social imaginary: a lack of contact, for Americans, has somehow devolved into an incessant desire to definitively know, see, and touch. Indeed, the familiar narrative of North Korea as an impoverished place headed by a cruel demagogue who murders his own family members is anchored by an Orientalizing fascination for the incomprehensible other. In effect, the desire to know, catalogue, and study the inaccessible other crystallizes through hypersensationalized tabloid-like discourse and imagery that satiates the hunger for transparency and evidential truth.

In this vexed field of ideological representations, one-dimensional caricatures and complex realities become muddled to the degree that the former substitutes for the latter. In the fictional feature-length film *The Interview*

(2014), Kim Jong-un, played by the Korean/American actor Randall Park, becomes the only living national politician to hold the dubious honor of being assassinated on the silver screen. One might also recall Margaret Cho's farcical portrayals of Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il on *30 Rock*, as well as her appearance on the 2015 Golden Globes as the robotic DPRK Army General "Cho Yung Ja." In these contexts, America's disdain for North Korea mutates into good and innocent American humor, as North Koreans are doubly cast as dangerous deviants *and* "normal humans" who want to consume global commodities that Americans freely enjoy. This oppositional construction of North Koreans—as monstrous and evil, as well as ordinary and "just like us"—becomes a proxy for and supplants the gray zones of complex subjecthood that can never be fully documented through the extractive methods of racialized documentation and visual capture.

But even in my attempts to problematize these troubling portrayals of North Korea in the United States and much of the West, I have struggled to articulate what it means to remember, reassess, and reencounter North Korea without seeking to elucidate, uncover, and ultimately contain. In part, this difficulty stems from my uncertainty about what I know and do not know about North Korea. Undoubtedly, I resist U.S. ideological portrayals of the North Korean state and, more generally, the Korean War. This book has sought to complicate Cold War ideological portrayals and discourse by offering alternative considerations, perceptions, and memories of the Korean conflict. Yet as a feminist ethnic studies scholar trained and situated in the United States—and as someone who cannot possibly speak for others who inhabit a very different position from my own—I am anxious that my observations, no matter how carefully framed or researched, will unintentionally contribute to existing power differentials and bolster one-sided perspectives of an "authentic" North Korea in the United States. And while any critical memory of the Korean War must destabilize the United States' deeply skewed portrayals of North Korea, I also distance myself from utopian narratives that reduce this place to an anti-imperialist society unblemished by state violence.

What, then, do I recognize and know about North Korea? What is it that I seek to question and unknow? Does questioning simply imply a countermove that replaces a hegemonic narrative with a more truthful version of history, or does it entail a different epistemological project altogether? My ties to this very real and very imagined place align with what Cristiana Kyung-hye Baik notes in "Wreckoning": North Korea *is where my grandfather spent time and Where my family / might have lived / had it not been / for division*. Given these ties, how do I make sense of a global history that is also my history without subsuming this reality to the confines of personal biography,

familial sameness, and cultural authenticity? *What else* is potentiated by this mnemonic praxis of questioning?

In considering these inquiries, I find Édouard Glissant's contemplation of opacity in *Poetics of Relation* a generative provocation. For Glissant, the "right to opacity" does not seek to mark, decipher, and "reduce things to the Transparent."⁵ On the contrary, opacity acknowledges the problematics of epistemology and knowledge formation, and how complex subjecthood and differences point to an "irreducible singularity."⁶ Framed this way, to question is not simply antithetical to the enmeshed projects of knowing and containing. Instead, questioning holds us accountable to the shape-shifting conditions of power that determine who and what we recognize in our daily lives.⁷ As a mode of refusal, the act of questioning considers how the desire to make transparent and categorize is too often sutured to projects of knowledge that justify conquest, enclosure, and occupation. By extension, questioning asks us to acknowledge that even in our most deliberate attempts to problematize the status quo, our maneuvers to debunk, challenge, and clarify are always already partial, subjective, and incomplete. In other words, there are limitations as to what we can access and definitively know.⁸ But it is precisely this partiality, this incompleteness, that animates interstices of opening and moments of connectivity through relational difference: to unknow permits us to "feel a solidarity" without seeking to "become the other" or "make [others] in my image."⁹ Only then may we begin to understand that "it is impossible to reduce anyone, no matter who, to a truth that he would not have generated on his own."¹⁰

Mobilizing Glissant's essay as a starting point and my sister's poem as a guide, the preceding pages contain passing observations, data and statistics, images, and borrowed poetry stanzas reassembled in my continuing attempts to question and unknow North Korea, at least in the ways that the United States perceives this place. In place of a more traditional conclusion that encompasses a comprehensive compilation of the book's key findings, this essay-in-progress materializes as an open-ended sequence of memory practices that formulates questioning *as* a critical form of remembering. Indeed, questioning is pivotal to what the poet Don Mee Choi calls a "geopolitical poetics," or cultural forms of expression that potentiate discordant memories in tension with dominant historiography. In part, these vexed acts of remembering otherwise interrogate the "humorous," the "familiar," and the "ordinary" by underscoring the accumulative violence that condition these very terms. These discursive processes of questioning, however, are not conclusive or finite; nor do they aim to supplant existing narratives with more truthful representations of "real life" in North Korea. Rather, the aforementioned pages ask us

to reconsider dominant perceptions by resensitizing us to the “limits of every method” and untethering our knowledges, even if a little bit, from the official “law of facts” that govern the everyday.¹¹ In a narrower sense, these diasporic memory practices provide an imperfect means for me to reencounter a place that feels so different and distant, yet so proximate and close to my diasporic personhood. They attempt to make sense of unrealized relationships, an arc of militarized migrations, and an unwritten history of familial dispossessions and disappearances that can never be rectified, reclaimed, or made transparent. In other words, they allow me to remember through and with opacity.

Memory: South Korea,” *positions: asia critique* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 77–102; Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

67. Lee, *Service Economies*, loc. 167. Also see Cheng, *On the Move for Love*.

68. Kaisen, “Translator’s Notes.”

69. Jane Jin Kaisen, *Dissident Translations Catalogue* (Århus: Kunsthall Århus, 2011),

54. Here, Kaisen cites from a description provided by the War Memorial staff.

70. Audre Lorde, “The Uses of Anger,” *Women Studies Quarterly* 25, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer 1997): 280, 282.

71. *Ibid.*, 280.

72. For a critical engagement with the notion of disidentification within performance studies, see José Esteban Muñoz, *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

Chapter 4

Epigraph: Seong-nae Kim, “The Work of Memory: Ritual Laments of the Dead and Korea’s Jeju Massacre,” in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Religion*, ed. Janice Boddy and Michael Lambek (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 2013), 236.

1. See the United Nations World Heritage entry for “Jeju Volcanic Island and Lava Tubes,” <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1264>, and “Introduction to Jeju,” Imagine Your Korea: Visit Korea website, https://english.visitkorea.or.kr:1001/enu/SI/SI_EN_3_6.jsp?cid=256109.

2. See Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Dong-choon Kim, *The Unending Korean War: A Social History*, trans. Kim Sung-Ok (Larkspur, CA: Tamal Vista, 2009).

3. Kim, *The Unending Korean War*.

4. Sang-hun Choe, “Island’s Naval Base Stirs Opposition in South Korea,” *New York Times*, August 18, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/asia/19base.html>.

5. Originally published (in German) as Sigmund Freud, “Trauer und Melancholie,” *Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse* 4, no. 6 (1917): 288–301; republished in English as “Mourning and Melancholia,” in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, vol. 14 (London: Hogarth, 1955), 243–258.

6. Here Anne Anlin Cheng’s study of the melancholic dynamisms of racial formation in the United States is a particularly compelling examination of the relationship between prolonged violence and the melancholic: see Anne Anlin Cheng, *The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

7. Jane Jin Kaisen’s *Reiterations of Dissent* includes two different versions: a five-screen installation first showcased in 2011 and an eight-screen installation showcased in 2016. In this chapter, I engage the 2016 version of the work. In addition, while I focus on Kaisen’s and Lee’s works in this chapter, I should emphasize that several other Korean and Korean diasporic cultural producers and curators provided insights critical to my research and writing process. For instance, Cho Sunjung, Choi Chang Hyun, and Choi Hwajung (affiliated with the *REAL DMZ Project* and Art Sonje in Seoul) discussed the significant public role played by Korean and Korean diasporic cultural producers in South Korea who examine in their oeuvres controversial issues such as military sex labor, transnational adoption, and civilian atrocities that the ROK government committed. I am immensely grateful for their tremendous efforts and support of Cho, Choi, and Choi, who also organized a personalized tour of the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) for me during the summer of 2016. While I do not take up Minouk Lim’s cultural work in this book (although I discuss her oeuvre elsewhere), my conversations with

her via e-mail and in person (in an August 2016 interview) allowed me to identify the historical struggles (e.g., government surveillance, funding resources, and political alliances) faced by artists in South Korea who address the ROK's contested history of military dictatorship.

8. See Henri Bergson, *Duration and Simultaneity*, trans. Leon Jacobson (Manchester, UK: Clinamen, 1999), and Gilles Deleuze's engagement with Bergsonian concepts of temporality in *Cinema I: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

9. Bergson, *Duration and Simultaneity*.

10. Bliss Cua Lim, *Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 11.

11. I draw on the definition of remediation that Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin provide in *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Remediation, in this chapter, refers to the incorporation or folding in of older media (i.e., archival footage) by a newer medium (i.e., digital film) to produce a distinct media object (i.e., the multichannel installation).

12. Judith Butler, *Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 23.

13. The Gangjeong Naval Complex was officially opened on February 26, 2016. For a detailed timeline and information about the construction of the naval complex, see the Save Jeju Now Campaign website, <http://savejejunow.org/> (accessed April 25, 2017).

14. For a description of the Northwest League, a paramilitary group primarily composed of anticommunist refugees from North Korea, see Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Random House, 2010), 101–147.

15. I am grateful for my conversations with Jane Jin Kaisen, which have continued via conversations in person and by phone since 2014. As discussed in several works in progress she shared with me, Kaisen emphasizes that “translating others” is a term that is always mobile and always shifting: Jane Jin Kaisen, “Translator’s Notes” (unfiled Ph.D. dissertation, University of Copenhagen), 2–3, in my possession. See also Kaisen’s description of “dissident translations” in “A Conversation between Cecilia Widenheim and Jane Jin Kaisen,” in *Dissident Translations*, exhibition catalogue, Århus Kunstbygning, Århus, Denmark, 2011, 8.

16. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University,” Seoul, March 26, 2012, White House Office of the Press Secretary, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university>.

17. Kaisen, “Translator’s Notes,” 2.

18. *Ibid.*, 1.

19. The first two quotations in this sentence refer to Kaisen’s practice of “translating otherwise” (Kaisen, “Translator’s Notes”). The second two quotations refer to Kaisen’s direct descriptions as she addresses the meaning(s) of dissident translations in “A Conversation between Cecilia Widenheim and Jane Jin Kaisen,” 8.

20. Kaisen, “Translator’s Notes.”

21. Michael Rush, *Video Art* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003), 11.

22. For an extended conversation about the role of film in relationship to (neo)colonial historiography and narrative construction, see Priya Jaikumar, “An ‘Accurate Imagination’: Place, Map and Archive as Spatial Objects of Film History,” in *Empire and Film*, ed. Lee Grieveson and Colin MacCade (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 182.

23. Marita Sturken, “Absent Images of Memory: Remembering and Reenacting the Japanese Internment,” in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. Lisa Yoneyama, Takashi Fujitani, and Geoffrey M. White (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 39.

24. Choe, "Island's Naval Base Stirs Opposition in South Korea." For a deeper analysis of the connections between tourism and militarization, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).

25. Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

26. Seong-nae Kim, "Mourning Korean Modernity in the Memory of the Jeju April Third Incident," in *The Inter-cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat (New York: Routledge, 2007), 199.

27. Ibid.

28. For an illuminating discussion of the performance of critical memories and "other" knowledges in relationship to the Asia-Pacific War(s), see Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 115.

29. See Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, 105.

30. Kim, "Mourning Korean Modernity in the Memory of the Jeju April Third Incident," 194; Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, 103–105.

31. Kim, "Mourning Korean Modernity in the Memory of the Jeju April Third Incident," 194.

32. For a more nuanced and detailed reading of the heterotopic, see Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16 (Spring 1986): 22–27.

33. For a detailed account of the post-1990 investigations of the Jeju massacres, see Hunjoon Kim, "Seeking Truth after 50 Years: The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3 (2009): 406–423.

34. "Blood History Buried under Jeju International Airport," *Jeju Weekly*, March 26, 2011, <http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1383>.

35. For a contextualization of debates about the inception of the 4.3 Massacre, see Kim, "Seeking Truth after 50 Years," 410.

36. During the most ferocious period of fighting, between 1948 and 1949, the U.S. military monitored the situation, interpreting the violent measures as necessary for containing communism in the "red island." In a message wired to Washington on May 13, 1949, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea noted that Jeju communist sympathizers and rebels had been successfully killed, captured, or converted: see Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Owl Books, 2000), 100–101.

37. According to Christine Ahn, because the villagers were given short notice about the April 24, 2007, town hall meeting, only approximately 10 percent of the village population was present. Although the former village chief, Yoon Tae Jun, promised to hold another village committee meeting, no such meeting ever materialized: see Christine Ahn, "Naval Base Tears Apart Korean Village," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, April 19, 2011, http://fpif.org/naval_base_tears_apart_korean_village.

38. Ibid.

39. Sasha Davis, "The U.S. Military Base Network and Contemporary Colonialism: Power Projection, Resistance and the Quest for Operational Unilateralism," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 215–224.

40. The United States maintained peacetime control in South Korea until 1994, when South Korea officially transitioned from a military dictatorship to civilian control. At this writing, the South Korean government will receive wartime command of the Korean military in 2020.

41. See Choe, "Island's Naval Base Stirs Opposition in South Korea."
42. Anders Riel Müller provides astute commentary on the "geopolitical curse" of South Korea: see Anders Riel Müller, "One Island Village's Struggle for Land, Life, and Peace," Korean Policy Institute, April 19, 2011, <http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/inter-views-opeds/110419andersmulleroneislandvillagesstruggle.html>.
43. Hilary Rodham Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.
44. For instance, the International Women's Network against Militarism, which includes scholars and activists from Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, the Marshall Islands, Guam, Hawai'i, Puerto Rico, Australia, and the U.S. West Coast, has expressed solidarity with the people of Jeju Island in an open letter from September 11, 2011. See <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/actions/lettertojeju.html>. The Okinawan Women Act against Military Violence and the Committee against Heliport Construction have also expressed solidarity with and active support for the people of Jeju Island: see "Event Reports and Photos—East Asia," Global Day of Action on Military Spending, April 17, 2013, <http://demilitarize.org/2012-reports-east-asia>. For broader analysis of the intersecting histories among Pacific Islanders and Asian/Americans, see Setsu Shigematsu and Keith Camacho, eds., *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2010); Davis, "The U.S. Military Base Network and Contemporary Colonialism."
45. See Sasha Davis, "Repeating Islands of Resistance," *Human Geography* 5, no. 1 (2012): 1–18.
46. See Jennifer Hyndman, "Mind the Gap: Bridging Feminist and Political Geography through Geopolitics," *Political Geography* 23 (2004): 307–322. It is also important to note that these outlined principles are part of a statement the Women for Genuine Security offered in 2011: see Davis, "Repeating Islands of Resistance," 4–5.
47. Mayor Kang Dong-kyun delivered his talk on June 1, 2013, in Berkeley, California. For the complete address, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CW4ZFA4hss.
48. These critical points are also encapsulated in the International Women's Network against Militarism's redefinition of security. For a specific definition, see the organization's website, <http://iwnam.org>.
49. Macarena Gómez-Barris, "Reinscribing Memory through the Other 9/11," in *Toward a Sociology of the Trace*, ed. Herman Grey and Macarena Gómez-Barris (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 2010), 235–256. In the chapter, Gómez-Barris explicitly engages Tzvetan Todorov's concept of *exemplary* memory.
50. David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 21.
51. Dohee Lee, interview by the author, September 22, 2015, San Francisco.
52. For an English text on the significance of the mythic figure of the goddess Mago, see Helen Hye-Sook Hwang, *The Mago Way: Re-discovering Mago, the Great Goddess from East Asia*, vol. 1 (Lytle Creek, CA: CreateSpace, 2015).
53. Lim, *Translating Time*, 2. Lim's work is in conversation with Bergson's, Deleuze's, and Dipesh Chakrabarty's critiques of modern time and temporality and with Frederic Jameson's and Tzvetan Todorov's engagement with the genre of the fantastic.
54. Lee interview.
55. Carter J. Eckert, Ki-baik Lee, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edgar W. Wagner, *Korea Old and New: A History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1990).
56. Koh Sunhui and Kate Barclay, "Traveling through Autonomy and Subjugation: Jeju Island under Japan and Korea," *Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 5, no. 5 (May 2007): 6.
57. Ibid. See also Koh Sunhui, "Jeju Islanders Living in Japan during the Twentieth

Century: Life Histories and Consciousness" (Ph.D. diss., Chuo University, Tokyo, 1996); Karen Wigen, "Culture, Power and Place: The New Landscapes of East Asian Regionalism," *American History Review* 104, no. 4 (October 1999): 1183–1201; Epeli Hau'ofa, "Our Sea of Islands," *Contemporary Pacific* 6, no. 1 (1994): 148–161.

58. Kwon, *The Other Cold War*.

59. Ibid.; Kim, "Mourning Korean Modernity in the Memory of the Jeju April Third Incident."

60. Nirmala Nataraj and Dohee Lee, "The *MAGO* Project," Dancers Group, November 1, 2014, <http://dancersgroup.org/2014/11/mago-project>.

61. José Esteban Muñoz, *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 3.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. I am grateful for Feng-Mei Heberer's suggestion to engage the presence of Lee's body in relation to the screen. For a critical reading of the *haptic* or sensual elements of cinema and media, see Laura Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). For a provocative reading of the relationship between the racialized gendered body, skin as surface, and performance, see Anne Anlin Cheng, *Second Skin: Josephine Baker and the Modern Surface* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For incisive readings of the relationship between the exploitative dimensions of neoliberal labor and speculative cultural productions that exist beyond the damaging confines of capital, see Aimee Bahng, *Migrant Futures: Decolonizing Speculation in Financial Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), and David Roh, Betsy Huang, and Greta A. Niu, eds., *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia as Speculative Fiction, History, and Media* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015).

65. For readings of the romanticized rendering of the *haenyeo* as idealized feminist figures within Korean history and the tourism industry's popularization of female divers, see Anne Hilty, "Haenyeo: The Truth behind Tourism: A Look into Jeju Diving Women's Not-So-Romantic Livelihoods," *Jeju Weekly*, March 11, 2013, <http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1314>; Gui-Young Hon, "Becoming a 'Legitimate' Ancestor: A Sociocultural Understanding of a Sonless Jamnyeo's Life Story," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 5, no. 3 (2004), <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/565/1227>; Gwi-Sook Gwon, "Changing Labor Processes of Women's Work: The Haenyeo of Jeju Island," *Korea Studies* 29, no. 1 (2005): 114–136.

66. Kim, "The Work of Memory," 237. See also Roger L. Janelli and Dawnhee Yim Janelli, *Ancestor Worship and Korean Society* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Inchu Pyo, "War Experiences and Community Culture," in *Chonjaeng kwa saramdul* [*Korean War, Community, and Residents' Experience*], ed. Inchu Pyo et al. (Seoul: Han'ul, 2003), 145–169.

67. Kim, "The Work of Memory," 231; Heonik Kwon, "New Ancestral Shrines in South Korea," in *Korea Year Book*, vol. 1, ed. Rüdiger Frank, James E. Hoare, Patrick Köllner, and Susan Pares (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 194–214.

68. Kim, "The Work of Memory," 230.

69. Ibid.

70. See Hon, "Becoming a 'Legitimate Ancestor,'" Gwon, "Changing Labor Processes of Women's Work."

71. Helen Hye-Sook Hwang, "Old Traditions as New Revelation: Magosim and Its Nostalgic Ethos Expressed in Pan-East Asian Primary Sources," paper presented at the Academy of Korean Studies Congress Gathering, 2008, 1. See also Helen Hye-Sook Hwang, "Issues in Studying Mago, the Great Goddess of East Asia," in *The Constant and*

Changing Faces of Goddess: Goddess Traditions of Asia, ed. DeePark Shimkhada and Phyllis K. Herman (London: Cambridge Scholars, 2008), 10–32.

72. Hwang, “Old Traditions as New Revelation,” 1.

73. Ibid.

74. Here my reference to “revised” versions underscores how Lee revises *MAGO* to reflect both the space of the performance venue and the agenda of the performance program. While *MAGO* is originally conceived of as a ninety-minute performance, Lee at times performs abbreviated iterations of *MAGO* or specific “chapters,” depending on the performance venue (e.g., anti-military conferences, dance festival, public performance in open spaces, or artist talk). Lee also maintains digitized clips from her varied performances on her website. For an updated list of Lee’s performances of *MAGO*, see <http://www.doheele.com/index.htm>.

75. Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 187.

76. Frazer Ward, *No Innocent Bystanders: Performance Art and Audience* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2012), 19.

77. Ward, *No Innocent Bystanders*, 21.

78. Maureen Turin, *Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1–2.

79. For texts that investigate the connective tissue between the history of domestic racial violence in the United States and militarized interventions abroad, see Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004); Derek Gregory and Allan Pred, eds., *Violent Geographies: Fear Terror, and Political Violence* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Deborah Cowen, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

80. Ward, *No Innocent Bystanders*, 18. Ward’s “horizon of experience” phrasing is borrowed from the critique of Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere in Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere*, trans. Peter Labanyi, Jamie Owen Daniel, and Asseka Oksiloff (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

81. Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 21.

An Opening

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1. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Department of Defense Report, 2006, as quoted in David Shim, *Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing Is Believing* (London: Routledge, 2014), 3–4.

2. Édouard Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, trans. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 193.

3. Don Mee Choi, *Hardly War* (New York: Wave, 2016), 4.

4. Caren Kaplan, “Sensing Distance: The Time and Space of Contemporary War,” *Social Text* online (*Periscope*), June 17, 2013, https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/sensing-distance-the-time-and-space-of-contemporary-war.

5. Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, 189.

6. Ibid., 190.

7. Ibid., 192.

8. In regard to my engagement with partial knowledges, I am deeply indebted to Donna Haraway's "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 575–599.

9. Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, 193.

10. Ibid., 194.

11. Ibid., 192.